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"UPRISING OF THIEVES" OR AN ABORTED REVOLUTION?

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To the memory of Mohammed 'Akl (1979-1997)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANCCPV	American National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
CD	Christian Democratic Party
CFS	French Communist Party
CP	Communist Party
CPI	Communist Party of Italy
CSF	Central Security Forces
ECP	Egyptian Communist Party
EGFLU	Egyptian General Federation of Labor Unions
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
EWCP	Egyptian Workers Communist Party
HNCCUS	Higher National Committee of Cairo University Students
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party
NLF	National Liberation Front
OSY	Organization of the Socialist Youth
PA	People's Assembly
PSTC	Progressive Socialist Thought Club
SCP	Syrian Communist Party
SPRS	Supporters of the Palestinian Revolution Society
TCP	Tunisian Communist Party

UMT *Union Marocaine du Travail*

VO **Vanguard Organization**

INTRODUCTION

The events, which took place on a national scale in Egypt during 18 and 19 January 1977, have aroused a great controversy and debate in the Egyptian political arena. Some political tendencies attempted to portray the events simply as "mob riots" triggered by the decision of the government to raise food prices. President Sadat had put it in a crude way, describing the events as an "uprising of thieves". The government official analysis of the events ran in the same tradition, in addition to accusing the underground communist organizations of plotting such havoc in an attempt to overthrow the government.¹ Sadat's views of the events were supported by the official press, which tried to portray the events as "criminal sabotaging plot".² The religious institutions and the reformist Islamist opposition like the Muslim Brotherhood shared the same views, and joined the anti-communist crusade blaming the Left for instigating the "mob riots".³

The aim of this study is to investigate the nature of the events of 18 and 19 January 1977. In my view, the events cannot be isolated from the wave of radicalization that was sweeping the world and the Middle East during that era. In other words, rather than being mere "riots" the events were the Egyptian part of the "global radical panorama" at that time. Therefore what I'll attempt to prove in my study is that despite the presence of a revolutionary situation, the 1977 *uprising* did not materialize into an *insurrection* due to the absence of a revolutionary party, as a result of the incompetent performance of the Egyptian communist Left.

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter sets out to review the literature I surveyed during my research period. The Literature Review section is divided into two main parts. The first deals with the theoretical literature related to riots and revolutions. The second is devoted to reviewing the literature related to the 1977 events. Whenever it was possible, I tried to present a critique of some of the theories and views I came across. The methodology I will be using throughout the study is then presented. Finally comes the Conceptual Framework section that outlines the main concepts in my research, demonstrating their relevance to the thesis.

Literature Review

Theoretical Literature Review

In order to be able to grasp the 1977 events and find the suitable framework for analysis, I tried to survey some of the literature on riots and revolutions, in order to be able to locate the events within one of these two categories. Of course, it is almost impossible here to present a survey on such extensive literature, so I will confine the review to a sample of the literature. On the issue of riots, I decided to focus on the studies examining the so called "ghetto riots" which took place in the US in the mid-1960s and 1992. I found the methodology used in these studies to be useful in examining the dynamics of resistance among the urban poor in general, and the fact that there were parallels to be drawn between the behavior of the rioters in the

American and the Egyptian events. As for the issue of revolutions, I will be focusing in the review on the literature that provides a useful methodology for analyzing the phenomenon. In addition to that, I am going to present the works that examine the two points that have aroused controversy and debate within the political and academic milieus: the nature of the revolutionary process and its contents.

Literature Review on Riots

The approaches taken to study such phenomenon differed according to the background of the authors. They can be categorized into two tendencies: conservative and radical. The first viewed riots as a threat to "national security", and as a "crisis" that had to be solved in order to preserve the system. However, in some of these studies, there was a level of "understanding" for the behavior of the rioters, and pointing out of hardships that should be addressed in order to defuse the social tension. The radical tendency on the other hand emphasized riots as an important dynamic of resistance among the urban poor. Riots are not a "crisis" to be solved, rather than being a tool of resistance that should be studied within the context of changing the status quo.

Conservative Views

Taking a conservative criminological approach to the phenomenon, Encyclopedia Britannica defines riot as an "offense against public order involving three or more people and the use of violence, however slight. Like an unlawful assembly, a riot involves a gathering of persons for an illegal purpose. Unlike an unlawful assembly, however, a riot includes violence."¹ Ralf Conant's book on the prospects of revolutions in the US expressed concerns for the growing instability in the American society in the 1960s. When defining the act of rioting, he stresses the spontaneous nature of the participants' behavior, in addition to the lack of

“premeditated purpose, plan, or direction, although systematic looting, arson, and attack on persons usually occur once a riot is under way”.²

A task force report submitted to the American National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (ANCCPV), set up to investigate the ghetto riots, tried to challenge the official conception of riots. The academics and lawyers, who were members of the task force, were neither radicals, nor did they advocate riots as a means of changing the status quo. They had concerns for the stability of the American society, however they advocated a new comprehension and new means of social controls that could address the grievances behind the riots.

The report criticized some of the conventional theories of riots. Firstly, such theories “tend to focus on the destructive behavior of disaffected groups while accepting the behavior of authorities as normal, instrumental and rational.”³ However, as the report pointed out, the “destruction”, or the violent behavior, of the forces of the state, can be, and usually are, more “destructive”. Secondly, these theories “tend to describe collective behavior [i.e., riots] as irrational, formless and immoderate”.⁴

The report refuses such assumption, as the rioters:

[S]how a considerable degree of structure, purposiveness, and rationality. Nor is “established” behavior necessarily guided by rational principle. While the beliefs underlying a riot may frequently be inaccurate or exaggerated, they are not necessarily more so than, for example, commonly held beliefs about racial minorities by dominant groups... [concerning] the causes of crime... [and] threats to internal security, and so forth. A measure of irrationality, then, is not a defining characteristic of collective behavior generally or of riots in particular; rather, it is an element of many routine social processes and institutions *and* forms of collective behavior.⁵

Moreover, the so-called “inappropriateness” of riots is relative, depending upon whether there are alternative channels of activities. The actors use rioting as a means of expressing their political demands in absence of the “normal channels”.⁶ Thirdly, it is wrong to view the rioters’ violent behavior as “abnormal”, or as resulting from

“tensions”. In other words, one should not attribute the whole phenomenon to psychological factors and neglect the political dimension for several reasons. Domestic violence of marginalized groups cannot be compared to the more severe systematic violence of the state. In addition to that, the rioters usually believe that the use of violence could pressure the state to concede to their own demands, and actually that was true in several cases.⁷

Radical Views

The radical literature, on the other hand, emphasized the rebellious side of riots, and their importance as an expression of defiance to the system. Studying the dynamics of the ghetto riots in the US, Gans considers the riots in general as a form of rebellion. Incidents of looting and property destruction, included in the riot, are not impulsive acts, as “in most cases, people destroy or loot only the property of those who have exploited them”.⁸ Gans compares the rioting situation to a carnival, not because of the irrationality of the rioters, rather:

They are happy at the sudden chance to exact revenge against those who have long exploited and harassed them. The rebellion becomes a community event; ... people feel they are acting together in a way that they rarely can. But, most important, the destruction and looting allows ghetto residents to exert power.⁹

When studying the LA riots that were triggered police racist brutality, Callinicos refuses either the idea portrayed by the media about the mass irrationality of rioters, or that “race” being the factor behind it. Instead he focuses on the class dynamics of riots, an approach that could be useful in my case study. Callinicos examines the economic context of LA, and the impoverishment that hit the city as a result of the austerity measures taken by Regan and Bush, better known as “Reganomics”. These measures affected the working class from all ethnicities, not only the blacks. The rioting was of multi-ethnic nature, coming as a reaction of the

urban poor against impoverishment and police oppression. The main target for the looting and property destruction was the Korean businesses. However, Callinicos denies "ethnicity" as a factor in making such businesses a target. It is the socioeconomic role played by Koreans merchants that made them a target for the anger and discontent of the masses in LA. The vast majority of Koreans act as entrepreneurs providing "valuable retail access to the ghetto for [big corporations]... without putting whites at risk".¹⁰ Callinicos admits that the "Korean merchants are not the chief exploiters of the black and Latino poor... [b]ut Asian shopkeepers are the only visible, directly accessible representatives of the system responsible for the poverty and degradation suffered by the mass of blacks and Latinos".¹¹

Jones and Molnar take a different approach. They are more interested in the means by which an insurgent group can *create* a riot. Thus they are not interested in the spontaneous factor of the rioting, devoting more attention to the possibilities of a conscious subjective activities aiming at creating a public civil disturbance. However, they did not have any illusions about the political limits of the riot, since "the simple creation of disorder does not automatically bring an insurgent group to power. It can, however, create a vacuum into which new organizational instruments power can move".¹² In their view, the "crowd" is not *subject* of political action, but its *object*, which is characterized by being emotional and easily manipulated:

The emotional perceptions and beliefs of the crowds that participate in civil disturbances often do not coincide with objective reality, and the individuals involved do not realize that their grievances are being manipulated in the politically subversive ways.¹³

The "conservative" and "radical" literature I reviewed about riots were of a great use to my study in terms of defining the concept itself and when it came to analyzing the behavior of some groups that participated in the 1977 uprising in

Egypt. That would be discussed in more details in the Conceptual Framework section.

Literature Review on Revolutions

The literature on revolution was much more heterogeneous. The given definitions, causes, strategy, and tactics of the revolutionary process differed according to the political tradition the author belonged to. Some authors tended to focus on the process of “political” change, while others had a more comprehensive view of the revolutionary transformation process that entails not only political transformations, but also wider socioeconomic structural changes. The revolutionary strategy differed also from one author to the other. Some viewed the masses’ *active* participation as a fundamental element in revolutions, while others conceived the revolutionary transformation to be brought about through the activities of an armed elite such as army officers and guerrillas.

Definitions

Encyclopedia Americana defines revolution as a “fundamental change in the government or the political constitution of a country, mainly brought about by internal causes and effected by violence and force of arms on part of a considerable number of individuals”.¹⁴

As for Kimmel, he defines revolutions as “attempts by subordinate groups to transform the social foundations of political power. Such efforts require confrontation with power-holder, and must stand chance of success to differentiate a revolution from other acts of rebellion, such as social movement or terrorist act”.¹⁵ Chalmers Johnson also tries to distinguish a rebellion from what he calls a “total revolution”. Following Hannah Arendt definition, he sees rebellion as “an act of social surgery; it is intended to cut out one or more members who are offending against the joint

commitments to maintain a particular social structure".¹⁶ A Rebellion lacks ideology, and whenever it exists, it is not a source of *motivation* rather than being a source of *justification* for the act.¹⁷ On the other hand, ideology plays an extremely important motivational role in "[t]otal revolutions...[that]... aim at supplanting the entire structure of values and at recasting the entire division of labor".¹⁸

Jean Baecheler views revolution as a "protest movement that manages to seize power". Sigmund Neumann adds to the definition so as to include the "sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominantly myth of a social order [thereby] indicating a major break in the continuity of development". While Samuel Huntington defines revolution as "a rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, government activity, and policies".¹⁹ However, the previous definitions assume, as Kimmel noted, the success of the revolutionary process.

When defining revolutions, Lechner stresses the social side of the transformation process. He defines revolutions as "processes in which a regime change is combined with the transformation of class structure, through class revolts from below. They are social rather than 'merely' political".²⁰ Distinction between political and social revolutions is drawn clearly:

Political revolutions transform only the authority structure, the state apparatus, leaving the class structure intact. Both can be contrasted with coups (or 'palace revolutions') which leave the state intact, changing only the government personnel. Coups should not be considered revolutions, despite the frequent claims to revolutionary legitimacy of their purveyors.²¹

Despite recognizing the importance of social and political transformation of the ruling regime, Moghadam, building on Willem Wertheim's views, stresses the

emancipatory character of the revolution. For her, “events are revolutionary not just in the sense of the overthrow of a regime by collective violence but in the sense of contributing towards the emancipation of the people, and that the violent overthrow of the old regime should involve less human suffering than the regime it replaced. This definition links revolutions to emancipation, and counterrevolution to a decline in the opportunities for emancipation”.²²

Causes

When discussing the causes of revolution, Kimmel distinguishes between “the *preconditions*, which include the longer-run, structural shifts in the social foundations of the society; the *precipitants*, which include the shorter-run historical events that allow these deeply seated structural forces to emerge as politically potent and begin to mobilize potential discontents; and the *triggers*, which are the immediate historical events that set the entire revolutionary process in motion”.²³

Developing Alexis de Tocequeville’s thesis concerning the French Revolution, James Davies generalized the theory of “frustrated expectations in a period of improving economic conditions”²⁴ as a major cause of revolutions. Davies argued that revolutions are most likely to occur in times during which there is a continuous improvement of socio-economic conditions. The people’s expectations usually rise in a higher rate than the rate of socio-economic improvement. Thus, massive frustration starts accumulating, and inevitably explodes on the occurrence of any short period of sharp economic reversal.²⁵ Alfred Muesel, on the other hand, argued for the complete opposite of Davies’s thesis. He viewed “economic decline and its effects, unequally shared in the system, lead to revolution”.²⁶

Leon Trotsky referred in his work, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, to military defeats as one of the possible causes for a revolution, whereby the regime

loses its legitimacy and gets exposed in front of its people as weak, corrupt and incompetent.²⁷ In fact Trotsky's argument was clearly true when I applied it to the case of Egypt and the Middle East following the 1967 War. The defeat of Nasser and the other Arab regimes in front of Israel acted as a catalyst for the mass movements in both contexts, engulfing the region in a revolutionary situation.

In his study of the elite inter-conflicts and its effect on mass mobilization, Lachmann draws some important observations on the increasing possibilities of revolutions at times of ruling elite conflicts.²⁸ The same goes for Bunce, who points to the divisions among the bureaucracy and the loss of coercive power as a revolutionary catalyst. However, generalizing from the Polish Crisis of 1980-1, he added another two conditions, which he viewed necessary for the creation of a revolutionary crisis:

- (2) a society in which important segments (as defined by the specifics of political economy) are angry, organized, and ideologically sophisticated; and
- (3) the entry into this situation of an external crisis that further redistributes power while enhancing social anger.²⁹

In an attempt to explain the causes of revolutions, Gurr put forward the theory of "relative deprivation". People revolt when they perceive a great "discrepancy between their *value expectations* and their environment's apparent *value capabilities*."³⁰ By "value expectations", he meant "the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled."³¹ While by "value capabilities", he meant "the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain."³² In my view, Gurr's "relative deprivation" was operating within the Egyptian context in the years preceding the uprising. The Sadatist regime's propaganda, following the launching of *Infitah*, was raising the public's expectations about the socioeconomic outcomes of the new

policies. The failure to materialize such expectations was one of the factors that sat the ground for the uprising.

Political-conflict theorists, like Tilly take a different approach. He focuses on the "conflict among governments and various organized groups contending for power, to explain collective violence and revolutions."³³ In his view:

[R]evolutions and collective violence tend to flow directly out of a population's central political processes, instead of expressing diffuse strains and discontents within the population;... that the specific claims and counterclaims being made on the existing government by various mobilized groups are more important than the general satisfaction or discontent of those groups, and that claims for established places within the structure of power are crucial.³⁴

Strategy and Tactics

Some literature I came across can be described as "elitist", emphasizing the role of the "revolutionary elite". Under this category fall the works of Nasser, Che Guevara and Auguste Blanqui. When discussing the typologies of revolutions, Johnson classifies the "Conspiratorial Coup d'Etat" under the "elitist" category. He defines such activity as "the planned work of a tiny elite fired by an oligarchic, sectarian ideology." However, he is willing to consider such process to be a revolution "only if it in fact anticipates mass movement and inaugurates social change."³⁵ The same argument was put forward by Nasser in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, whose words implicitly disregards the role of the masses, despite the populist rhetoric, viewing the revolutionary change to be delivered *from above* by the enlightened vanguard.³⁶

The works of Guevara and Auguste Blanqui offer a great deal of rhetoric about the "masses" of workers or the oppressed, but they tend to have an elitist conception of the revolutionary process itself. In the case of Guevara, a group of armed intellectuals and peasants waging guerrilla warfare from the countryside to

“liberate” the cities is the ideal type of revolution.³⁷ The same goes for Blanqui, who viewed the revolution as the act of the “vanguard” minority of the armed workers, who should carry out immediate insurrections and raise the barricades in the streets to overthrow the regime and establish workers' power.³⁸ Along the same tradition comes the Maoist tendency. Mao substituted the working class and the urban masses by the army of peasants from the countryside led by the revolutionary intelligentsia, carrying out the “revolution” in the name of the proletariat.³⁹ These views substitute the mass action by the action of the armed elite that will bring about the “liberation” of the masses. The masses in that case become the object of history, not its subject.

It is important to note here that the previous views are characterized by a great doze of voluntarism and idealism, and totally contradict the Marxist tradition, whose basic principle is that, the “liberation of the working class is the act of the working class.” The Marxist conception of the relation between the “revolutionaries” and the masses will be discussed later when the role of the “revolutionary party” is examined in the Conceptual Framework section.

Literature Review on the 1977 Events

It is strikingly odd to find that the sources written in Arabic about the 1977 events are rare. Probably the most well known book is *Egypt on 18th and 19th of January*, by Hussein Abdel-Razek, a leading member of *al-Tagammu'* Party and the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP). The book documents aspects such as official government statements, leftist parties' leaflets and statements, State Security Prosecutor's interrogation minutes and interviews. The author provides his own analysis of the events in the first section of the book. He supports the idea that 1977 was a “people's uprising”, not merely mob riots. The decision by the government to increase the food prices and eliminating subsidies was just a *trigger*, not the cause of

the uprising. The *precipitants* for the events lie in what he calls Sadat's "counterrevolution" on 15 May 1971. Abdel-Razek favors the Nasserite policies, viewing them as a necessity for development, socialism and political independence from the hegemony of imperialism. The new policies adopted by Sadat contradicted the Nasserite political line. In his view, Sadat's regime was more coercive and sought dependence on oil-producing Arab countries and US imperialism. In addition, he views Sadat's policies as attempts to:

...change the social and economic reality of Egypt, and erasing every accomplishment of the 23rd of July revolution in the economic and social structure... especially the era of post-July 1961 resolutions... [in order to] achieve the interests of parasitic capitalism composed of commissioners, black market traders, brokers, foreign companies' agents, and the kings of commissions and smuggling. That was done at the expense of the worker, peasant, small merchant, honest civil servant, craftsman, and the productive Egyptian capitalist.⁴⁰

The 1977 events were an expression of a crisis with deep roots in the Egyptian society. The *preconditions* of the events lied in the crisis of democracy, the fight for "real independence" from imperialist hegemony, and the struggle to achieve "social justice". However, Abdel-Razek's stand towards the events is not coherent. On the one hand, he's stressing that its was a "people's uprising", but on the other hand he attempts to distance the Left, which supposedly he was one of its leaders, from the events. He refrained from declaring his support for the uprising and defended the *al-Taggamu's* stand, which he was one of its formulators, condemning "assaults on public or private property... violence and agitation for demonstrations".⁴¹ Abdel-Razek's stand was more of saying to the government: "You see? We have told you it'd be better to give some reforms. Now you've got yourselves a revolution!"

In his book titled *The Counterrevolution in Egypt*, Ghali Shoukri, a prominent Egyptian leftist, agrees with Abdel-Razek's presentation of the background of the events and their roots. He devotes the first chapter to defending strongly the Nasserite

“achievements”, and blaming the Sadatist regime for the “deterioration” that followed his “counterrevolution” in 1971. His arguments are very similar to Abdel-Razek's, though they are more detailed and supplied with statistics. Shoukri expressed clearly his support for the 1977 uprising, criticizing the vacillation of the legal and underground leftist organizations and their inability to make a strong intervention in the events.

Shoukri points to the upsurge of the students' movement in 1971 as a crucial factor for the development of the mass movement. One could trace Marcusian influences in his analysis of the “sociology of the revolution”. He saw the uprising as the culmination of the Egyptian workers' “class consciousness” mixed with the “organized consciousness” of the students and the intelligentsia. When tackling the issue of violence, the author resorts to a cultural element. He claims that the Egyptian identity is “patient”, and “pacifist”. The Egyptian masses would never assault public and private property, because of the “civic feeling that these institutions belong to the sons of Egypt”.⁴² However, in the case of the 1977 events, the masses attacked what seemed to them as “foreign” symbols. That includes nightclubs, police stations, and the government itself.

The final book I found on the 1977 events was Ahmad Sadek Sa'ad's *Studies in Egyptian Socialism*. Sa'ad was also a member of the ECP, but his stand towards the events differs from that of Abdel-Razek's, because Sa'ad belonged to a leftist faction inside the ECP. In Chapter 2, titled *A Second Reading of the January 1977 Events*, he provided the background for the uprising, an account of the events, a critique of the left, and finally a conclusion of why the uprising was aborted. He viewed the events to be a popular uprising that could have developed into an insurrection.

The author began his analysis by tracing the changing class and demographic structure of Cairo starting from the late 1960s. Then he provided a critique of the Nasserite policies, tracing the root causes of the uprising to the failures of the Nasserite state, something that Abdel-Razek failed to grasp. He pointed out, though briefly, to the divisions that existed within the Sadatist regime concerning the economic and foreign policy to be adopted. He refers to these divisions as one of the factors that led to the vacillation of the regime. After presenting an account of some of the events, he moved to outline the positions of the regime and of the different political forces, focusing more on the Left. He provided a harsh critique of the performance of the Left (*al-Tagammu'*, ECP and the Egyptian Workers Communist Party [EWCP]). In his view, the Left did not intervene efficiently in the events, and when it did, it was for the sake of having some political gains through self-promotion. The ECP and *al-Tagammu'* failed to grasp the spirit of the uprising, which was "overthrowing the Sadatist regime".⁴³ While the radical Left, represented by the EWCP confined itself to reformist demands that were far below the potentials of the uprising. He concluded by emphasizing the Left's ideological and organizational flaws and its failure to link itself to the movement, as the major factor leading to the defeat of the uprising.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework used through the course of the study is Marxist in essence. However, I will be using some of the concepts I found in the non-Marxist literature I surveyed, which are useful and do not contradict the Marxist tradition. In order to be able to determine the real nature of the 1977 events, the two most important concepts to be defined are "riot" and "revolution".

Riot

I will use Conant's definition of the concept of riot, which was included in the Literature Review section:

Rioting is a spontaneous outburst of group violence characterized by excitement mixed with rage. Riots are usually directed against alleged perpetrators of injustice or gross misusers of political power. The typical rioter has no premeditated purpose, plan, or direction, although systematic looting, arson, and attack on persons usually occur once a riot is under way. Also criminals and conspirators may expand their routine activities in the wake of the riot chaos.⁴⁴

What needs to be highlighted here is the fact that riots, despite having deeply rooted causes related to system injustices and despite being an act of rebellion, they lack a clear and coherent "premeditated purpose, plan, or direction". That constitutes one of the major factors that differentiates a riot from a revolution. The latter exhibits a higher level of demand-articulation and organizational tradition on behalf of the mass movement. This is an issue that I will focus upon when I investigate the Egyptian revolutionary situation and uprising.

The remarks made by the ANCCPV, mentioned earlier in the Literature Review section, on the "destructive" powers of the forces of the state also proved to be valuable in my study. They drew my attention to several important issues related to the behavior of the states in the phases of the uprising and counterrevolution in the global, regional and Egyptian contexts. In the first two contexts, the superior "destructive" abilities of the states helped to preserve the status quo. In the Egyptian context, the "destructive" activities practiced by sections of the participants in the uprising actually came as a "response" to the violence unleashed by the security forces in the first place.

In addition to his class analysis of the social context of the riot, Callinicos' methodology in explaining the socioeconomic reasons for which the Korean

businesses were chosen by the rioters to loot and/or destroy was of a crucial importance for me when I dealt with the Egyptian uprising. It helped me in explaining why specific institutions and businesses were chosen by the participants in the uprising as “targets” for their attacks.

Revolution

Defining Revolution

A revolution is defined as a mass movement from below that aims to overthrow violently the political regime in order to substitute the existing ruling class, with another new one. In other words, as the leading American Marxist thinker Hal Draper puts it, “[t]he revolution that concerns Marx is defined by the social change it entails, by the class relationships in that [process of] change. It is a political revolution which is the immediate manifestation of a social revolution.”⁴⁵ Draper was building on Engels’ conception of revolution: “it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon....”⁴⁶ What needs to be highlighted here is that the two cornerstones of the revolutionary process are: a) violence; b) the change of class structure of the society and the state.

Components of the Revolutionary Process

There are related concepts that have to be defined. In order to analyze the conditions setting forward the ground for a revolution, I will be using the three concepts presented by Kimmel: *preconditions*, *precipitants*, and *trigger*, in addition to another four related concepts, taken from the Marxist tradition, that deal with the *dynamics* of the revolutionary process itself: *a revolutionary situation*, *uprising*, *insurrection* and *counterrevolution*. These concepts have to be defined, and put into the proper sequence in order to be able to analyze the revolutionary process.

The preconditions are the longer-run, structural shifts in the social foundations of the society. The precipitants are the shorter-run historical events that allow these deeply seated structural forces to emerge as politically potent and begin to mobilize potential discontents. The precipitants, when developed, create a revolutionary situation. Lenin described the symptoms of a revolutionary situation as follows:

When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another among the 'upper classes', a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is not usually sufficient for the 'lower classes not to want' to live in the old way; it is also necessary that 'the upper classes should be unable' to live in the old way.⁴⁷

The triggers are the immediate historical events that set the entire revolutionary process in motion. An uprising is the development of a revolutionary situation set forward by the trigger. It involves a general strike, and different forms of confrontations between the masses and the forces of the state, which vary from one situation to another, such as street fighting, taking over of factories and neighborhoods and raising barricades. However, at that stage the government would still be in power and the class structure of the state remains unchanged.

The climax or the final stage of the revolution is the armed insurrection. That is when the state is finally assaulted and overthrown by armed masses, most of the time accompanied by mutineers from the rank and file soldiers. Marx specified two important elements in the phase of insurrection. First is the element of cautious organizational planning, as "insurrection is calculus with very indefinite magnitudes, the value of which may change every day".⁴⁸ Second is the "offensive" rather than the "defensive" character of the use of violence.⁴⁹ The Marxist tradition stresses the necessity of existence of a subjective factor in order to be able to move successfully from the phase of the uprising to phase of insurrection, and finally completing the

insurrectionary phase: a revolutionary party, deeply rooted within the toiling class, in order to be able to organize the final assault against the centralized forces of the state.

The failure to develop the revolutionary process forward beyond the revolutionary situation results in a counterrevolution. My definition of the term is based on two classical works in the Marxist tradition that dealt extensively with that issue. The first is *Revolution and Counterrevolution* by Marx, and the second is *The Revolution Betrayed* by Leon Trotsky. Counterrevolution is the use of force in an attempt by sections of the *ancien regime* or reformist political forces to maintain the status quo and bring the revolutionary transformation process into halt. In the case of the reformists, usually the façade of the existing regime changes, however the core of the socioeconomic relations of power does not.⁵⁰

The Egyptian revolutionary process developed according to the pattern mentioned above. The *preconditions* phase extended from the end of WWII till the beginning of the 1960s, where the Nasserite development plans were causing massive changes within the Egyptian class structure, characterized by socioeconomic and ideological contradictions. The economic failure of the Nasserite state capitalist project and the political failure in terms of the 1967 defeat signaled Egypt's entrance into the *precipitants* phase with the deepening of the economic crisis and the revival of the mass movement after a long slumber. The *revolutionary situation* started to develop following Sadat's rise to power, with divisions appearing within the ruling class, the continuous economic deterioration and the escalation of the militancy of the anti-regime mass movement. The government's decrees related to raising the prices of basic commodities acted as a *trigger* to the *uprising* that occurred on 18 and 19 January 1977. The defeat of the uprising was followed by a *counterrevolution*

launched by the regime in terms of crushing the uprising, the mass movement and the Left.

The "Successful" Revolution

The Overthrowing of Capitalism

When studying the outcomes of the global and regional revolutionary situations and uprisings, there had been several cases in which the ruling regimes were overthrown. In the case of Egypt, the economic decrees that triggered the uprising were abolished by the government. However, according to the Marxist conceptual framework I am using these "revolutions" failed. A "successful" revolutionary process is the one that ends with the complete overthrow of the old ruling class and brings a new one into power. A change of governing personnel, or replacement of a faction of the ruling class by another, do not qualify a revolution to be successful.

Revolutions against pre-capitalist systems (such as feudalism) differ radically from revolutions against modern capitalism. The potentials of revolutionary change and the margin of socioeconomic and political freedoms to be achieved have been always limited by the backwardness of the pre-capitalist systems. That provided the objective conditions for the continuation of class divisions and the rule of the tiny minority (whether they are feudal or capitalist).⁵¹ However, capitalism provided for the first time in Mankind's history the opportunity to have *abundance* rather than *scarcity*, because of its unprecedented productive capacities. Such abundance, in addition to the socialization of the production process, provide the objective conditions for the abolishing of classes.⁵² Hence, the potentials for revolutionary change under capitalism go beyond the "change of regimes", "change in institutions", "change of governance" and "change in political culture" that characterized the

outcomes of the global, regional and Egyptian revolutionary situations and uprisings discussed in my study.

The only class *objectively* capable of destroying the capitalist system is the working class, because it is the class, which creates the wealth, and cannot reproduce private property, in case of its ascendance to power, due to its role in the socialized production process.⁵³ Other classes (namely the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie) cannot carry out the task of destroying the capitalist system. Marx pointed out to the limitations of the peasantry revolutionary activity:

The small-holding peasants form an enormous mass whose members live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with each other. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse... Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name.⁵⁴

The petty bourgeoisie cannot present a coherent political project of their own, since they are vacillating all the time between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; being oppressed by the system, but at the same time having a share from the capitalist cake. Hence, petty bourgeois movements tend to be contradictory, lacking the ability to formulate a principled and coherent opposition to the status quo.⁵⁵

Revolutions that have non-proletarian leadership end in failure according to the Marxist tradition, since the assuming of leadership by any other class would ultimately lead to the reproduction or the maintenance of the capitalist system. Hence the relations of class oppression are reproduced again, under the old form or a new one. That case occurred in all the revolutions within the global and regional contexts investigated in my study, where reformist parties, petty bourgeois movements or sections of the old establishment spearheaded and defused the revolutionary

situations, in order to stabilize the status quo under new banners. In the case of Egypt, the change of some governing personnel and the concessions related to economic policies following the uprising do not qualify the events as a successful revolution.

The Revolutionary Party

The only case in the 20th Century where the working class seized state power was in Russia 1917. This takes us to another crucial factor for the success of a revolution under capitalism, a factor that only existed in the case of the Russian Revolution: the revolutionary party.

The necessity of a revolutionary party for the success of proletarian revolutions against modern capitalism has to do with the intellectual hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the working class:

[The Workers] belong to an oppressed class that lacks the experience of running society, because capitalists don't only own the material means of production but the mental means of production. Because of that we need a party- the party is the university of the working class.⁵⁶

Workers are influenced by the prevailing bourgeois ideologies including sexism, racism, nationalism, reformism, and other ideas that divide the working class, or strengthen the grip of the bourgeoisie upon them. This does not mean that the workers conform completely to the capitalist arguments. Their consciousness is subject to contradiction all the time:

The heart of Marxism is that the emancipation of the working class is the act of the working class... [However, at the same time]... "The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."... The balance between the two factors-self activity of the working class and subordination to ruling class ideas-is not static. It changes all the time. Sometimes the changes can be slow and imperceptible over a long period, but then they can change dramatically in a very short time.... However, a change in the balance between the two factors does not depend only on what happens in the workplace, on the economic front. Engels wrote that the class struggle takes place in three fields: the economic, the political and the ideological. The three fields are of course interconnected, with the economic serving as the base and the political and ideological as the superstructure. But workers' combativity can rise, and even

explode, not only because they are victorious in a struggle over wages or against sackings, but also because of events in the political field.⁵⁷

The idea of the contradictions in workers' consciousness was important in my analysis of the preconditions phase in the global, regional and Egyptian contexts. The political and ideological contradictions were examined, and I found the same approach applicable in the case of the students' milieu within the same phase. Engels' view on the rise in militancy of the mass movement caused by "non-economic" factors was also very useful when I started examining the three contexts in the late 1960s. Several "political" and "ideological" factors helped to radicalize the workers' movements, flaring their militancy against their ruling regimes.

The unevenness of consciousness among the rank and file of the working class movement remains even during the course of the revolution itself, despite the radicalization that encompasses the whole class. While some *advanced* sections would like to push the revolutionary process forward to establish workers' power, other *backward* sections are likely to remain inactive, or even join the ranks of counterrevolution. The vast majority of the workers would like to see social and political change happening, hoping it will come quick and easy. In fact even in the midst of the revolution itself, the workers, if left without the conscious subjective intervention of a revolutionary organization, would be looking for reforms, anxious to see their demands carried out without the huge effort needed in a revolution. A great part of this has to do with the intellectual hegemony of the capitalist class, as mentioned before. A revolutionary party with deep roots in the working class, encompassing the most militant sections of the proletariat, can be able to lead this centrist block of the working class winning them to the idea of workers' power, in addition to centralizing the forces of the working class during the uprising.

The Marxist tradition, as put forward by Lenin, stresses the dialectical and organic relationship between the revolutionary party and the working class. At the beginning, Lenin had an elitist conception of the revolutionary party, as outlined in *What Is To Be Done?* He saw the revolution "must necessarily be the work of a vanguard group rather than of a mass party".⁵⁸ He conceived the proletariat at that time to be incapable of generalizing politically in their struggles, confining their consciousness to "trade-unionist" issues. The task of the professional revolutionaries was to bring into the working class the social democratic consciousness *from without*.⁵⁹ However, the experience of the 1905 Russian revolution altered completely Lenin's conception of the limits of working class consciousness, and consequently the party-masses relationship. He declared in 1905 that "the working class is instinctively, spontaneously Social Democratic."⁶⁰ Instead of limiting the membership of the revolutionary party to professional revolutionaries, he called for "opening the gates of the party," so as to "rally all the worker Social Democrats round [party members, and to] incorporate them in the ranks of the party organizations by hundreds and thousands."⁶¹ Thus what Lenin was striving to build was a fighting organization deeply rooted within the working class. It would contain the most militant sections of the working class. It is a "vanguard" in terms of militancy and clarity of views, but not in the substitutionist sense. The self-activity of the masses was a corner stone of Leninism, a fact that Stalinism attempted laboriously to negate. Trotsky stressed this point in a powerful metaphor: "Without a guiding organization the energy of the classes would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-box. But nevertheless what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam."⁶²

The need for a revolutionary party for the success of the revolution is stressed even in some bourgeois literature that is hostile to Marxism. Though he reserves many

criticisms against Marxism and does not view the proletariat as the spearhead of the revolutionary forces, Samuel Huntington stresses the crucial importance of the “radical revolutionaries” organized in a party in order to develop the revolutionary situation forwards. According to him, the revolutionary party plays a major role in expanding “political participation, to bring new masses into politics.” It is such mobilizational role that can bring the masses to the forefront of the struggle, integrating them within the political community, leading to a more effective use of force against the status-quo institutions. The role of the party does not stop at the success of the insurrection, but it also continues the mobilizational process to help building the post-revolutionary state institutions.⁶³

The absence or impotence of the revolutionary parties in the three contexts examined in my study could provide an explanation for the role played by reformism in disrupting the revolutionary process. In the global context, reformist parties (social democrats and Stalinists) were able to win the support the workers in the midst of the revolutionary situations. In the regional and Egyptian contexts the regimes’ reformist concessions in addition to the reformist Stalinist parties participated in stabilizing the class struggle during the precipitants phase, then played a crucial role in diffusing the revolutionary situations and disrupting the uprisings.

Methodology

The methodology I am planning to use in this research is the Marxist historical materialist method. The method focuses on the centrality of socioeconomic factors and class struggle in shaping history, and attempts to explore its dynamics as the best means of analyzing the progress (or regress) of history. Thus, through the course of my analysis, I will be focusing on the situation of the economy; the class formation of

the society; the economic changes and their manifestations in the political tendencies of the regime(s) and the other social classes.

Internationalism is an important cornerstone of the Marxist praxis and the Marxist approach in analyzing radical social changes within a society. The international perspective must be taken into consideration. Revolutions in a country do not occur in isolation from what is happening in the rest of the world, or at least from the radical changes taking place in the region of that country. Some refer to that as the "domino effect"; when one piece of domino is hit, the rest start to fall consequently. That applies for revolutions, especially under capitalism as a one integrated system encompassing the whole globe. As Tony Cliff put it, the "world capitalist system is like a chain composed of a number of links of national states. When the pressure reaches extremes, one of the links is bound to break. When this happens it affects other links".⁶⁴ Historical empirical experiences of revolutions in the past century tend to confirm Cliff's hypothesis, almost turning the domino effect into a law of history. Just to cite one example: the domino effect of the Russian revolution. The revolution triggered series of revolutions across Europe; in Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Austria, and caused a massive instability and radicalization in Britain, France and in many other places; to the extent that made the US representative in Paris write: "We are sitting upon an open powder magazine and some day a spark may ignite it".⁶⁵ Therefore, I believe in order to study properly the Egyptian context, both the global and regional socioeconomic and political contexts will also have to be examined.

Conclusion

The next five chapters will be devoted to examining the revolutionary process Egypt went through starting from end of WWII till the late 1970s. The events of

January 1977 were the climax of that process. The Egyptian context will be investigated, in relation to the radical sociopolitical transformations occurring in the world and the region. I will attempt to operationalize the seven concepts of the components of the revolutionary process, clarifying the impact of the global and regional radicalizing factors on the Egyptian context in each phase.

The Marxist model for a "successful" revolution, mentioned in the previous section, will be used as a framework for examining the disruptions that occurred within the global, regional and Egyptian revolutionary situations, which prevented the materialization of workers' power. The main focus of the study in the field of the mass movements will be the communist organizations in the three contexts. This is because they were the political forces that should have played the role of the "revolutionary party" crucially needed for the successful development of the revolutionary process. In fact, the absence of such revolutionary parties, or the incompetent performance of the communist movements would be the major factor that reversed the revolutionary process into a counterrevolution in the three contexts.

CHAPTER II

THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

THE GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND EGYPTIAN PRECONDITIONS

Introduction

This chapter presents the global, regional and Egyptian preconditions following WWII. Despite the relative "stability" of the three contexts, the chapter uses the Marxist dialectical method, investigating the political and socioeconomic contradictions of the capitalist boom that laid the seeds of the future social explosions.

The Global Preconditions

Economics of the Boom

Following WWII, global capitalism entered its longest boom. Unprecedented rates of growth were achieved by the industrial West. For example the American GNP by 1970 was three times greater than it was in 1940. Since 1949, Germany increased its industrial output by five times, while the French output grew by four times. Japan increased its industrial production by thirteen-fold, turning to be the second largest economy in the world after the US. Similar results were achieved also by the Soviet Union, whose industrial output in the mid 1970s was seven times its size in the mid-1940s¹

The boom was caused by several factors. The Western governments adopted Keynesian policies aiming at achieving full employment by encouraging government intervention into the market, inducing the aggregate demand, so as to avoid the crisis of overproduction inherent within the capitalist system.² They also resorted to the Permanent 'Arms Economy, to defuse the possibilities of occurrence of economic

crises. The governments' expenditure on arms soared in an unprecedented manner following WWII. That had a positive impact on the rates of profit in western economies, since:

- 1) Part of the investible surplus value that might otherwise have stood idle was ploughed back into the process of production. The state ensured this occurred even if the general rate of profit was low.
- 2) The goods produced by this state-induced investment neither competed with the consumer good output of the civilian economy (and so did not force down prices and profits rates even more or threaten to bring about overproduction) nor took the form of new means of production that would have raised the ratio of capital to labor throughout the economy (and so again did not reduce the rate of profit).³

The boom had its effect on millions of western citizens, in terms of rising standards of living. Harman sketches such a "rosy" era:

For close on 20 years the problems that had plagued the advanced countries between the First and Second World Wars seemed to be disappearing for good. Unemployment fell. Living standards rose steadily. The old slum tenement blocks and back-to-back houses were being systematically demolished. 'You've never had it so good,' proclaimed Britain's Tory prime minister Harold Macmillan during the 1959 election campaign- and most people agreed.⁴

Politics of the Boom

The capitalist expansion had a stabilizing effect on social struggles in the industrial world. Levels of industrial militancy were very low, and student movements were almost non-existent. Exceptions to the calm global panorama existed. Inter-state conflicts took place during the era of the 1950s and 1960s. The Cold War was flaring, with the two superpowers competing to create spheres of influence. Anti-colonial uprisings were staged across Africa and Asia.

Spontaneous social struggles also exploded in the industrial West from time to another during the 1960s: mass general strikes were staged by workers in Belgium, Italy, Japan and US in the years 1959-61.⁵ However, the Western system remained

relatively stable, as it "seemed able to absorb these conflicts; within the space of a couple of years it was as if they had never happened".⁶

In northern Europe reformist Social Democracy played a crucial role in maintaining the status quo by providing its ideological pillar, and organizationally by containing any discontent from below within the ranks of the working classes through its hegemony over the union bureaucracies. While in the US, "consensus politics" dominated both the Republicans and the Democrats, with the union bureaucracies collaborating with big businesses and the state to defuse industrial conflicts.⁷

In southern Europe the picture was relatively different, though its countries also shared in reaping the fruits of the boom. In Greece, Spain and Portugal, fascist military regimes enforced "stability" on their societies using means of terror.⁸ Despite having a "democratic" system, France and Italy were ruled by authoritarian governments. In both countries, the Communist Parties (CPs) claimed the support of millions of workers and trade unionists. They depended mainly on their historical record of leading the anti-fascist resistance during WWII.⁹ Despite using a revolutionary rhetoric, the CPs were clearly Stalinist in line. They opted for parliamentary politics, and sought eagerly to share power with their ruling bourgeoisie, who regarded them with mistrust due to the "Soviet" factor, i.e. the CPs' allegiance to the Soviet foreign policy.¹⁰

In the East, the Soviets were in control of the eastern European states that acted as satellites revolving around Moscow, with the exception of Tito's Yugoslavia. The ruling CPs were originally weak, but seized power through the Red Army by the end of WWII. Brutal coercion, with the help of Moscow, was used in order to preserve the status quo and the Soviet hegemony.¹¹

Contradictions of the Boom

The 20 years that marked the "golden age" of capitalism laid the preconditions for the 1968 revolutionary explosions, through the set of contradictions they were creating. Reaping the fruits of the capitalist boom was an extremely uneven process. While the industrial West and the Soviet Union were witnessing a concrete progress, the picture was relatively different in other parts of the globe:

For every success story there were half a dozen failures. India and China built huge centers of industry, but the mass of the population continued to live in rural impoverishment. In Latin America urbanization often took place more rapidly than industrialization, creating massive shantytowns... 'Modernization' too often meant no more than the creation of an urban elite with western tastes, while the conditions of life for most people remained as appalling as before....¹²

At the economic level, contradictions existed within Keynesianism and the Permanent Arms Economy. Keynesian policies laid the seeds for uncontrollable inflation starting from mid-1960s. It would lead later to a sharp decrease in the profitability of investment capital, and a downturn in industrial profit rates, in addition to an increase in deficits and public debt.¹³ At the same time, the Permanent Arms Economy's stabilization effect on capitalism was only temporary, laying the seeds for a future global crisis. Diverting surplus value from productive investment, through arms expenditure, tended to prevent economic slumps at the expense of a long-term tendency towards stagnation. However, the economies which exhibited a relatively high level of military expenditure, finding themselves at a competitive disadvantage comparatively to countries like Japan and West Germany (which were denied armaments following WWII), would react latter by increasing the share of investment in civilian industries, to meet up the challenge of competition. This would only lead to a tendency of reasserting the classical business cycles of booms and busts.¹⁴

The capitalist boom was also creating social contradictions. It led to a massive expansion in the size of the Western and the global working class, in addition to speeding up the process of proletarianization, rural-to-urban migration and urbanization. According to OECD statistics:

In France nearly 30 percent of the people still worked the land in 1950; by 1967 this had fallen nearly half to 16.7 percent. In Italy 40 percent worked the land in 1950; by 1967 less than 25 percent. As late as 1956 in Japan 38.5 percent worked on the land; by 1967 only 23 percent. In Ireland the proportion fell from 40.1 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 1967... The decline was matched by growth in the number of urban workers. In 11 years after 1956 the 'non-agricultural' workforce grew by 13 million (25 percent) in the US, by nearly 12 million (65 percent) in Japan, by 2.7 million (22 percent) in France, while in Italy it grew by 1.2 million (about 11 percent) in just 8 years.¹⁵

Mediterranean Europe would join the process, at a much lower rate. That had serious sociopolitical implications. The traditional power depended mainly on "counterposing the mass of independent small farmers [who were highly conservative] to the political weight of industrial workers".¹⁶ The urbanization process disaffected the power structures of the southern European regimes. At the same time, it started to create a bigger sociopolitical weight for the urban working class. Harman brilliantly sketches the change in the class-consciousness of the newly urbanized workers:

The change was not necessarily visible at first. The new workers often brought with them old attitudes... But in time the new workers were bound to change. Although the wages might at first have seemed relatively good to young, single workers fresh from impoverished rural backgrounds, it was not long before they discovered these were not sufficient to provide for families. Just as important, they were subject to ever-increasing workloads and intense managerial discipline.¹⁷

In France, the CRS riot police was frequently sent to break "economic" strikes over wages, with the help of the army that also scabbed on strikers. While in the US, the question of racism against the Afro-Americans was laying the seeds for future explosions.. The blacks started to form an important social segment within American

capitalism, because of the proletarianization process the black community was passing through due to the rural-to-urban migration in the southern centers or migration from the southern farms to the northern urban centers.¹⁸

Social changes were also occurring within the students' milieu. Historically, university education was confined to members of the elite. Those who were allowed access to higher education were the sons and daughters of the ruling classes. For them, university was a chance to get a couple of years of leisure, where they were trained to be the future leaders of the society. They were immune from any social threats; they benefited from the status quo and had little interest in changing it. However, the post-WWII capitalist boom had an impact on the education system and the nature of the students' community. The development of the forces of production and the technological revolution meant that the sort of labor force needed had changed. The "new worker" had to be educated in order to be able to deal with the modern highly developed production schemes. For the first time higher education was open to the sons and daughters of the middle and working classes on an unprecedented scale. The number of students in Austria increased over the period 1949-1969 by 193%, in Belgium by 350%, in France by 449%, in Greece by 357%, in Italy by 334%, in Portugal by 354%, in Spain by 300%, in the UK by 236%, and in West Germany by 358%.¹⁹

The expansion in the education system was definitely a positive gain for the middle and working classes. However, the picture was not that "rosy" for the students. They suffered from severe contradictions. Large numbers of students were placed in crowded and unhealthy classrooms, taught ruling class ideology, which had little to do with the reality they were living in. They suffered from isolation caused by life on campus, in addition to authoritarian regulations that characterized the university

administrations. Thus for the students, university was a transitional phase in their lives; the examination system was a cutthroat competition; its results determined whether the student was going to join the ranks of the elite or the unemployed. This uncertainty about the future caused severe alienation among the students. This it is argued is one of the major reasons for the spread of "culture of drugs" within the student community.²⁰

Having a great span of "leisure" time and being without overburdening "responsibilities", the students had the chance to examine their surroundings locally and internationally, and question the status quo. Later they would constitute one of the radical forces for change in their societies. However, their ability as agents of change was always subject to limitations. Unlike the case of the working class, students lacked economic power. They did not participate in the production process. They even did not constitute a class. They were in a transitional phase, that would determine latter their class position. Hence, they were only capable of disrupting order and creating havoc. Their political power was impotent without the support of the other sections of the working population, those who create the surplus value. But their political consciousness had the potential to radicalize the rest of the society.²¹

Regional Preconditions

The Rise of "Revolutionary" Nationalism

Following WWII, the political landscape of the region was in a continuing process of change. The governments in power in most Middle Eastern countries were mainly representatives of the traditional aristocracy, with clientalistic ties to Britain and France.²² However, by the end of WWII mass movements swept the region. The movements were anti-colonialist in nature, but in several cases they were also

insurrectionary social movements with the working class playing a central militant role:

In the three main centers of struggle—Egypt, Iran and Iraq—mass mobilization had its impact in every area of society. Working class organization positively affected even sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the urban poor and the peasantry, which had been under largely conservative influence.²³

Radical nationalist and communist parties were on the rise in the Middle East. Despite having strong influence on the mass movement, communism failed in pushing the struggle forward because of its Stalinist nature that opted for class collaboration with the Middle Eastern bourgeoisie. That created a vacuum for petty bourgeois-led army coups establishing “nationalist regimes which seized power with the aim of weakening such struggles”.²⁴ Frustrated by the defeat in the 1948 Palestine War and by the clientalism of their ruling classes, and at the same time paranoid about the mass mobilization from below by the working classes, the Middle Eastern middle classes intervened heavily in the political arena through the army officers.²⁵

The developments in Nasserite Egypt were to have a deep impact across the region. The regime under strong pressure from below, and attempting to defuse the mass movement, opted for a national development policy that led to a war with the West in 1956 over the Suez Canal. The anti-imperialist stand taken by Nasser in the war, turning him into an Arab “hero”, generalized support for the Nasserite ideology, and caused a severe radicalization across the region:

During the conflict there were mass demonstrations of solidarity, including strikes in the Gulf oilfields. In this radicalized atmosphere the anti-colonial movement in Iraq moved into a situation of revolutionary potential and pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan came close to collapse. In the late 1950s CIA chief Allen Dulles, seeing the movement sweep towards the Gulf oilfields, described the region as ‘the most dangerous place in the world’.²⁶

With the rising star of Arab nationalism (Nasserism and Ba’athism), the region was polarized into two camps; the “progressive” and “reactionary” regimes. The

“progressives” (mainly Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and latter to be followed by others) modeling themselves along the Nasserite Egyptian model, adopted republicanism, Arab Nationalism and “Socialism” as the state ideology; and developed close ties with the Soviets.²⁷ The “reactionaries” spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Jordan adopted monarchical system with close ties to the US and Britain.²⁸

Arab nationalism (especially its Nasserite version) was an inspiration and a radicalizing factor for masses in the Middle East, triggering a military nationalist coup in Iraq in 1958; unity with Syria and a civil war in Lebanon in the same year; direct assistance for the Algerian war of independence; a military coup in Yemen in 1962.

The “unstoppable” rise of nationalism was assisted by the dismal failure of the Arab communists, who were actually more organized and had originally a bigger base of support. Guided by Moscow’s Stalinist strategy of the “popular fronts” and the “stages theory”. On finally consolidating their grip on the Soviet state apparatus the Stalinist bureaucracy was not enthusiastic to get into “revolutionary adventures” in the international political arena. The Stalinist bureaucracy was rather more concerned with the stability of its country, military and economic competition, as well as establishing alliances with other states to secure its imperial interests. It also revised the communist strategy of the international communist parties to suit its interests. The task of the communists in developing countries dominated by imperialism was transformed fundamentally by the *Comintern*’s leadership. Organizing for the socialist revolution was to be postponed. The revolutionary process had to pass through “stages”. The country had to pass first through a “national democratic” revolution, where the bourgeoisie should lead the other classes to accomplish the transformations carried out historically by the western European bourgeoisie. Once this “democratic” stage was passed, the society would be ready for the transition from capitalism to

socialism. As for the communists, their task primarily was to get into a "popular front" with the most "progressive" sections of the national bourgeoisie to accomplish such revolution. The communists should not maintain their independence and the leadership of the front would be in the hands of the bourgeoisie.²⁹ That strategy strengthened the nationalist element in the CPs' ideology in the developing countries including the Middle East. This led to ideological and organizational compromises with their national bourgeois classes and ruling regimes, and to catastrophic defeats.

In Iraq the CP was the strongest in the Arab world. By 1959, with the nationalists led by Qassem in power following the coup, most party members (especially the base cadres) were anticipating an attempt to seize power, which could have easily taken place.³⁰ However, following Moscow's insistence the party's collaboration with the "progressive" sections of Qassem's government, wasted the opportunity. The party paid a heavy price for within months the nationalists launched a campaign of terror against the CP. Four years later, the Ba'athists in power dealt a severe blow to the CP, massacring thousands of its members. In Lebanon, the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) set out to form fronts with the sectarian leaders, courting 'progressive' personalities such as Pierre Jemayel, the leader of the fascist Phalange. In Iran, the communist Tudeh party failed to exploit the revolutionary potentials before and during the rise of the nationalist government of Mossadaq in 1951. The vacillation of Tudeh had a drastic impact on the workers' movement. With the anti-Mossadaq coup, the Shah was restored again, launching a terror campaign against the workers' movement. The Tudeh's response was the adoption of a policy of "inactive survival", which meant that it was not possible anymore to confront the Shah's regime.³¹ In Syria, the CP was on continuous ascendance, especially in the years 1956-7, with deep roots within the working class and the army. The West

viewed the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) to be a real threat, and anticipated a seizure of power by its militants. *The Times* described Khaled Baqdash, the general secretary of the SCP, as "the most dominant personality in Syrian politics in spite of his lack of office".³² However, the SCP refused to seize power, opting for popular frontism, with the blessing of Moscow, aiming at just "sharing" power. The hesitation of the party allowed the Ba'athists to invite the Egyptian army into Syria, speed up the unity talks with Nasser, then finally crush the communists in 1959.³³

By the 1960s the CPs in the Middle East were discredited by young radical activists for their compromises and collaboration with the new "revolutionary" elites. Moreover, their support of the partition of Palestine, dictated by Moscow, had a catastrophic impact on their base of support.³⁴

Socioeconomic and Ideological Contradictions

The period starting from the beginning of the 1950s till the mid-1960s was marked by socioeconomic and ideological contradictions that paved the way for the future 1968 explosions. The "progressive" regimes heavily based their legitimacy on:

'[R]evolution', 'Arab Unity', 'anti-imperialist' struggle, and...a struggle on behalf of the Palestinians, but in each country they were in fact preoccupied by the effort to develop a new state capitalism, with all its implications for domestic politics, including the establishment of a deeply repressive internal regime.³⁵

The "socialism" adopted by the "progressive" regimes was portrayed as an alliance of the "working forces of the people".³⁶ Several reforms were granted, but that was far from socialism. The "progressive" regimes established state capitalist systems, with "revolutionary" army generals, in control of the resources through a bureaucratic-military alliance. That was accompanied by the establishment of highly oppressive one-party police states, causing an increasing economic and ideological alienation of the masses in the region from their regimes.

The state had used the centralization of political power in its hands to centralize the economy under its control. But the centralization of both powers in its hands made it subject to strong and generalized popular pressures from below, to adopt social policies that sometimes contradict the targets of capital accumulation. Also, the centralization of industry in its hands made it behave like a capitalist monopoly, which threw the burden of some sectors' losses upon the other profit-making sectors. That created obstacles for capital accumulation in all branches of industry. Not only that, but also the tariff barriers imposed by the state, which helped it to receive huge profits by monopolizing the local market, led to the screening of competition away from the public sector companies. Competition is the strongest motive for technological development under capitalism. Consequently, the state capitalist elite would be shocked to find themselves after decades of economic control, too technologically behind to compete in the world market.

The rapid industrialization process led to massive expansion in the size of the industrial working classes in the region. In addition to that, the expansion in the education system was creating a highly politicized students' community and a "new middle" class in the region. In Syria for example, the number of pupils in the elementary and secondary schools jumped from 165,000 in 1946 to 424,000 in 1960, reaching 1,156,172 by 1968.³⁷ In Iraq, the number of students enrolled in high education grew from 4,591 students in 1950-1, to 29,160 in 1965-66.³⁸

The radicalizing effect of Nasserism and Ba'athism had a contradictory dynamic. Although both ideologies embraced "revolutionary activity", and made the liberation of Palestine a cornerstone, these aspects were confined to rhetoric most of the time. Instead, they opted for substitutionism, attempting to channel mass activities into support given to the ruling "revolutionary" regimes. The "revolutionary" regimes

were to deliver socialism *from above*, and were to fight on *behalf* of the Palestinian and Arab masses.³⁹ Even when it came to spreading the "nationalist revolution", Nasser and the Ba'athists opted for military coups instead mass mobilization from below, like the case of the 1952 Nasserite coup in Egypt, Kassem's 1958 coup in Iraq, the Nasserite Shawaf's 1959 coup attempt in Iraq, the 1963 Ba'ath coup in Iraq, the series of Syrian Ba'ath coups in the 1960s, and the Yemeni Nasserite coup in 1962. However, in my view, the high level of demagogy was in fact politicizing and radicalizing the Arab masses, raising their social and political expectations. Though this policy *from above*, worked for a while stabilizing the levels of social and political struggles, it would later create an increasing disillusionment among the Arab masses.

The Egyptian Preconditions

The Rise of Nasser and the Failure of Communism

The Egyptian political arena was in a turmoil following WWII, with an escalating level of mass struggles. The Egyptian working class was in the forefront of the national and class struggles, with a wave of mass strikes (especially in the years 1946-47). Guerrilla warfare flared in the Suez Canal cities against the British occupation.⁴⁰ The *Wafd* party -led by nationalist sections of the landowning elite that preferred "moderate" means of struggles like negotiations and limited mobilization- was discredited in the eyes of many Egyptians.⁴¹ Student unrest was also on the rise.⁴² Frustration within the ranks of the middle and low-ranking officers was mounting especially after the defeat in the Palestine 1948 war.

In a country where the national question was still the most radicalizing factor, the political elite was co-opted within the colonial administration. As for popular resistance against the occupation and the local elite spread, it was strong but not strong enough to overthrow the monarchy and face the colonialists. As a result, a

political vacuum was created in the Egyptian political arena. The petty bourgeoisie, whose members spearheaded most of the national liberation movements, intervened to fill in the vacuum. The climax came with the intervention of the army into the arena in 1952, led by middle ranking officers coming mainly from petty bourgeois background.

The Egyptian communists, who were also ideological and organizational satellites revolving around Stalin's Moscow, were an obstacle to the materialization of the mass struggles into an insurrection against the king and the British colonialism. The communists focused their propaganda and agitation on the national cause, postponing the social cause till "later". They attempted laboriously to engage in popular fronts with the Egyptian bourgeoisie, abandoning their organizational independence. The communist organizations tailed the *Wafd* party, and could not present an alternative to the mass of Egyptians even when revolutionary crises created a vacuum in the leadership; most notably in the 1946 upsurge and the outbreak of guerrilla warfare in 1951. The leadership of the movement that came from petty bourgeois background indulged itself in sectarian fighting with other organizations in the stream.⁴³

However, the level of radicalization, which engulfed the Egyptian working class, showed clearly revolutionary potentials that exceeded the aims put forward by Egyptian communism, which failed miserably in catching up with the leftist radical shifting among the workers. Henri Curiel, the leader of *Haddettu*, the biggest communist organization in Egypt then, admitted:

At the time it could be said that the masses were still ready to follow us. But we no longer knew where to lead them: we were completely inexperienced.⁴⁴

However, as Fermont noted:

It wasn't just lack of cadre that led to defeat. Through all twists and turns, the national question took priority over class conflict, constantly leading the movement into splits, confusion and humiliating defeats.⁴⁵

By the early 1950s the movement had split into sectarian fragments unable even to take a coherent stand towards the 23rd of July regime.⁴⁶

The mentality of a petty bourgeois intellectual could be sensed clearly when reading Nasser's *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, whose words implicitly disregard the role of the masses, despite the populist rhetoric, viewing the "salvation" to come *from above* by the enlightened vanguard, which is surrounded by an ocean of opportunism, backwardness and corruption:

I was startled by the reality following the 23rd of July... The vanguard⁴⁷ has carried out its task... then stood waiting for the arrival of the sacred marsh of the organized combined columns to the great goal. It waited too long. Endless masses have arrived, but how far was reality from imagination! The masses that came were... obstructing the sacred marsh for the great goal... it was then that I felt... that the vanguard's task has not ended, rather it started.⁴⁸

For Nasser and his comrades, what Egypt needed foremost was order, national independence, development, sovereignty, and internal social contradictions to be dealt with by taking into consideration that the biggest contradiction was external. These are all demands championed mainly by the local petty bourgeoisie, whose political elite have been discarded because of their weakness and collaboration.

Such political elite was not totally discarded by the initial phase of the coup. The new regime had tried at the beginning to establish friendly relations with the business community. It issued several laws in order to facilitate and encourage the national capitalists to intervene and participate in "modernizing" Egypt. Laws were issued by the new regime, such as law no. 430 for the year 1953 and law no.25 for the year 1954, extending the tax exemption period of industrial projects to seven years, and five years for the existing projects with an expanding capital. The regime even

tried to attract foreign capital more enthusiastically than the 1940s governments. For example, in 1953 a new mining law was issued facilitating the entrance of foreign capital in the oil-mining fields. Law no. 26 for the year 1954 facilitated further conditions for the foreign investments, allowing the external flow of profits, and allowing foreign capital to own 51% of the corporations' capital instead of 49% as the old law of 1949 specified.⁴⁹

Despite the huge efforts performed by the new regime, the local and foreign capital did not step into the market, a case that had been repeated in many newly independent countries. This led the regime to step in using the power of the state, and carry out the task of the capitalists, create infrastructure needed badly by Egyptian capitalism, and mobilize the resources needed for such projects. Such move was inevitable at that time in order to maintain the system, and establish huge projects that were crucial for the process of capital accumulation, like the High Dam, creating industrial base and transfer of surplus from the countryside to the industry.

The establishment of state capitalism (the Stalinist version of "socialism"), in addition to the anti-imperialist stand taken by Nasser in 1956 and the rapprochement with the Soviets, had an impact on the Egyptian communist movement, leading to its final collapse. Reunified under the Soviets' direction, the Egyptian CP changed its position towards the Nasserite regime, declaring its "uncritical support" for Nasser. By 1959 the party had effectively ceased activity. The disorientation caused by Stalinism was so strong that:

[T]he party could tell its members incarcerated in the Egyptian regime's prison camps that 'We are a party in power.' It liquidated in 1964 on the grounds that with the 'working class' (the Nasserist Bureaucracy) in power, independent proletarian organization was unnecessary.⁵⁰

Contradictions of Nasserism

The Nasserite project in Egypt during the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s was laying the seeds for economic and political crises to come in the future. The state capitalist project that Nasser began actively to develop following the 1956 war was an ambitious one, aiming primarily at industrializing the country. However, the problem that faced the new regime was the funding. The Egyptian regime opted for maximizing the surplus taken from the countryside and channeling it towards the urban industrialization. The agrarian reforms were not only aiming at the destruction of the power of the traditional aristocracy and responding to the pressure coming from the peasants, but also it tried to encourage the Egyptian elite to invest in the industry instead of in the land. When that move did not bring the expected results, Nasser decided to carry out industrialization through using the state power. The series of land reforms, though it benefited the rich peasants, exploited the countryside heavily.⁵¹

The exploitation process was carried out through the state control imposed on agriculture: monopolizing the means of agricultural production, credits, and most importantly the means of marketing. The state used to sell the inputs of the production process for high prices, and force the peasants to sell the crops for the state in prices lower than that in the global market, taking the difference in prices as a revenue for the state to fund the industrialization process. However, that was not enough. So the regime opted for other options, which were to cause a massive economic crisis in the future: internal and external borrowings.⁵²

The industrialization and modernization schemes adopted by the regime were expanding social forces that would be in the forefront of opposition later: the students and the working class. The free education given to the sons and daughters of the working and the middle classes were expanding on a large scale the student community. Over the period 1952-66, secondary school students increased by 115%,

while university students' enrolment increased by 271%.⁵³ Also the industrialization scheme increased the size of the Egyptian working class by 500,000 workers.⁵⁴ Both of these social forces owed their allegiance to Nasser. But under the surface, there was discontent because of the regime's repressive policies towards them. In the first year of the coup, 1952, the regime crushed strikes, executing two workers, and trying several others in martial courts. By the end of 1953, most of the labor-unionists, who were struggling to maintain the independence of the unions were jailed. Strikes were outlawed, and anti-union laws were decreed. Finally, the Egyptian General Federation of Labor Unions (EGFLU) and the Ministry of Labor were established in 1959 to exert absolute control of the regime on the labor movement.⁵⁵ The students were also subject to authoritarian practices in the university campuses. The Organization of the Socialist Youth (OSY) in addition to the secret Vanguard Organization (VO), were established by the regime, to integrate the students within its apparatus. These were the only two agencies allowed to operate within the campuses, and were used heavily for intelligence operations to silence any dissident or discontent among the student community.⁵⁶

At the political level, the regime's propaganda rested mainly on Arab unity and the Palestinian cause. In reality, Nasser's performance in both these areas was an utter failure. The United Arab Republic that was formed with Syria in 1958 collapsed after 3 years.⁵⁷ As for the Palestinian cause, the "battle" remained as rhetoric only with nothing achieved on the ground. One of the first moves taken by Nasser on reaching power was restricting the Palestinian guerrilla activities.⁵⁸ Later he announced in 1960 that he had "no plan" for liberating Palestine.⁵⁹ When signs of Palestinian self-activity started to appear, he rushed with the rest of the Arab rulers to

form the PLO as a means of controlling and hindering the Palestinian resistance activities.⁴⁶

These socioeconomic and political failures did not lead right away to the collapse of Nasser's popularity or a loss in his legitimacy, but it was creating disillusionment among sections of the population, and would lead later to the social explosions in the late 1960s.

Conclusion

The stable post-WWII panorama was marked by contradictions that would later give way to the 1968 struggles. The *means* of stabilization used by regimes in the global, regional and Egyptian contexts might seem different, but their *dynamics* were relatively similar.

On the three levels, the regimes used ideological and economic stabilization policies. In the case of the West, it was reformism as an ideology and Keynesianism as an economic policy. In the case of the region and Egypt, radical nationalism was the ideological pillar and state-capitalism was the economic mode. When these stabilization mechanisms failed, brute force was employed on the three levels. What were strikingly similar on the three levels were two aspects. First was the social product of the boom, in terms of the expansion of the working class and the students' community. Second was the identical role played by the CPs. The later outbreak of struggles in 1968 would tend to converge the three levels, in terms of the mass movement and the regimes' cooperation to quell the revolts, as will be shown in the coming chapters.

CHAPTER III

CRACKS IN THE WORLD ORDER

THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PRECIPITANTS, REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS AND UPRISINGS

Introduction

The social structural changes caused by the boom in the global and regional levels were due to have political manifestations by the late 1960s. The socioeconomic and ideological contradictions exploded creating a revolutionary situation in the two levels. Several radicalizing factors intervened to accelerate the development of the revolutionary process. This chapter examines the precipitants, revolutionary situation and uprising phases that the world and the Middle East had gone through starting from the late 1960s till the mid-1970s.

The Global Precipitants

The Economic Slump

The capitalist boom started to slow down by the mid-1960s, due to the inherent contradictions in the two means the western governments used for economic regulation: Keynesianism and the Permanent Arms Economy. Keynesian policies had uncontrollable inflationary effects (approaching "double digits" by the late 1960s) on the western economies, causing serious consequences on their performances. Many of the economic indicators experienced a turning point downwards. The rates of investments that were on the rise during the 1950s through the mid-1960s slowed down with the profitability of capital on the decline, especially in the field of

manufacturing. That was accompanied by the beginning of a downturn in Industrial profit rates. De Angelis draws a picture of the crisis undergoing formation:

The welfare state appeared to crumble under the weight of increasing deficits and exponential increase of the public debt. All these trends could be translated into DM, Lire, or Pounds because the turning point was more or less evident in all major capitalist countries and resulted in the collapse of the mechanism of their international coordination, the Bretton Woods system.¹

The contradictions within the Permanent Arms Economy were also due to exploding. The arms expenditure burden was unequally distributed among the western states; with the US having biggest share of that burden. Britain and France were intermediate spenders, while countries like Japan and West Germany did not share the burden at all because of the post-WWII military arrangements. That created a golden opportunity for Japan and West Germany to benefit from the favorable conditions created by the Americans and invest heavily in civilian industries competing successfully against the US and other advanced countries in the global market. But this would not last forever:

Those economies with a relatively high level of arms expenditure, finding themselves at a competitive disadvantage, would react by increasing the share of investment taken by civilian industries, and thereby allow the tendencies towards a classical business cycle to reassert themselves. On this analysis, then, the growing rivalries within the Western bloc between the USA, on the one hand, and Japan and West Germany, on the other, were a foreseeable consequence of the uneven distribution of the arms burden within the Atlantic alliance whose outcome, lower American military spending, could only lead to a decline in the rate of profit and global recessions such as those of 1974-5 and 1979-82.²

The Radicalizing Factors

Several "external" radicalizing factors played a significant role in pushing the revolutionary process forward. That included Mao's "Cultural Revolution", the martyring of Che Guevara, and the Vietnam War.

The year 1961 witnessed the start of a split within the world communist movement between China and the Soviet Union. Mao attacked Soviet "revisionism",

calling for the "world revolution". Maoism took to new heights with the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao decided to launch a purging campaign against his enemies, mobilizing millions of Chinese students. The Cultural Revolution captured the imagination of millions of students and activists around the world, seeing the events as a "march against the conservatism and bureaucracy of the older generation. Their revolt was seen as clear proof that China could avoid the degeneration of the revolution that had occurred in Russia under Stalin".³ Maoism became an integral part of the new students' radicalism in the world, and a primary source of inspiration. For millions of students, intellectuals and workers, it seemed to present an alternative to the bureaucratic CPs and their opportunistic policies.

The Cuban Revolution, and later the martyring of Che Guevara, were another radicalizing factor. Guevara attacked the bureaucratization of the revolution, criticized the Soviet imperialism, and called for the formation of global guerrilla armies to overthrow capitalism. Guevara organized guerrilla campaigns in several countries, till the CIA finally killed him in 1968 in Bolivia. The assassination turned him into a martyr, a revolutionary icon, and a symbol of radical idealism, inflaming the imagination of the youth all over the world.⁴

Finally, came the intensification of the Vietnam War, which caused an unprecedented level of radicalization of students all over the world. The anti-war movement was to shape the radicalism of the youth in the late 1960s in the West, and inspire millions of others to take up arms against their governments or colonizers across the globe. Reflecting back on his experience in 1968 as a student leader, Tariq Ali says: "The Vietnamese example had shown everyone that no Big power was invincible. They were all paper tigers."⁵

The Global Revolutionary Situation and Uprisings

The slowdown in world economy, accompanied by the radicalizing factors mentioned above, led to global sociopolitical explosions by the late 1960s, especially in 1968. In the US, what started as a peaceful and reformist civil rights and anti-war movements in the beginning of the 1960s went through radical transformation. The relation between them was one of a dialectical radicalizing effect and an alliance between several factions of the two movements, reflecting the high level of political generalization the American mass movement had reached.

After a series of ghetto uprisings in the mid-1960s over issues of police racist brutality, the Civil Rights movement, essentially reformist in nature aiming at "integrating" Blacks within "white" America, reached a new level of militancy, presented by the Black Power movement. The movement incorporated elements of radical Black Nationalism, with Maoist and Guevarist inspirations, in addition to adopting left-wing social program.⁶

The anti-war movement took up to new heights after the Tet Offensive by the National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas in January 1968. It would soon change the general mode of the American public towards the war and spark massive confrontations with the forces of the state, causing severe unrest in the American society till the mid-1970s.⁷

The developments in the US would soon have its domino effect across the globe. Donald Sassoon points out to the domino effect of the American events in terms of politics and even culture:

[There was a] central importance of the war in Vietnam as a strong –perhaps the strongest– catalyst of the student protests of 1967-72... European students who marched against the war in Vietnam in fact had considerable sympathy for the American students, who were liable to be drafted. The civil rights and anti-war movements of the USA were a source of inspiration. Radical students in Europe enjoyed the rhythm of American music, adopted American terminology and drugs, sang American protest songs, wore American clothes.⁸

The strongest events in 1968 occurred in France, and were due to spread the revolutionary domino effect across student and workers milieus across the globe. The anti-Vietnam war sentiments, in addition to the model presented by the Chinese Cultural Revolution, would find echoes and mass audience among the French students. After series of demonstrations over "authoritarian" issues in the first months of 1968, France entered a revolutionary situation by May. Tens of thousands of students occupied their universities.⁹ "Campus soviets" were declared with students effectively in control of the universities. Red flags, with pictures of Mao, Che, Lenin and Trotsky were hung all over the walls and statues of the university campuses and buildings. Teach-ins about revolutionary issues mushroomed everywhere.¹⁰ Coming under massive pressures from below, the communist-dominated trade unions called for a one-day strike. The response was massive with one million showing up on the marsh in the streets of Paris. Against the implicit wishes of their leaders, the workers continued their strike. Everything came to halt in Paris, with an estimated 10 million striking workers occupying their factories raising the red and black flags of revolution.¹¹

In Northern Ireland, a civil rights movement, inspired by the American model, started in 1968. The Catholics organized against sectarian Unionist rule demanding equality with the Protestant majority.¹² The movement was soon to go through radical transformation by the beginning of the 1970s, developing into an armed Republican campaign against the British occupation and their Unionist clients.¹³

In Czechoslovakia, students and workers rose up against the Stalinist hegemony over their country, with radical factions in the movement mainly influenced by the western "New Left".¹⁴ The Prague Spring would soon to be crushed

by soviet tanks. In Yugoslavia, after continuous agitation for two years centering around issues related to the Vietnam war, the Warsaw student movement and ideas of the German New Left, radical groups of students and intellectuals sparked massive college occupations and street demonstrations calling for reforms, "real socialism" and direct workers' control.¹⁵

The domino effect would reach as far as Mexico, where Guevarism and the New Left were to have strong influences among the students' and intellectuals' milieus. The radical mass movements in Mexico started in the anniversary of the Cuban revolution in July 1968, when hundreds of Mexican students on march carrying Guevara's pictures were brutally attacked by the riot police. Massive college occupations started and were accompanied by street demonstrations, in which up to half a million people participated.¹⁶ The strategy and tactics used by the Mexican students were influenced heavily by their European counterparts:

The images of student revolt of May and June in France are reverberating through everybody's heads. The students strive to make the same links their French comrades did, to widen their protest into social revolt. They throw the occupied buildings to everyone, they hold teach-ins, they set up Action Brigades to go leafletting in the streets and factories, demanding the release of the political prisoners and the resignation of the security forces' chiefs.¹⁷

In Italy, the students' struggle started as early as 1966, with the leading groups shaping their ideas through the adoption of:

... 'anti-authoritarian' theories mixed up with hotchpotch of ideas from Marcuse, Regis Debray's rendering of Guevara, Stokely Carmichael's version of Black power, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.¹⁸

The militant intervention of workers in the French May events, would have a great influence on the Italian student movement, shifting their attention to the necessity of organizing around workers' issues.¹⁹ The results were spectacular, with

the explosion of the "Long Hot Autumn" of industrial struggle that lasted throughout the 1970s.

In Britain, after years of organizing around the issue of Vietnam War, the radical left suddenly found itself on the lead of a mass student movement and in the forefront of demonstrations that encompassed tens of thousands. University occupations started to spread by the late 1960s. The leading radicalizing factors in effect were as the same as the rest of the globe. Harman describes the ideology of the new student leaders:

[They] presented Mao as the prophet of revolution. His model of guerrilla warfare was seen as the inspiration of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution as the model for student revolt everywhere.²⁰

The radicalization was soon to spread to the working class, launching the era of the "Industrial Upturn". After a long slumber, the British workers carried out mass strikes and factory occupations starting in 1969 and reaching their peak in 1974 when the miners' strikes brought down the Conservative government.²¹

The global radicalization continued into new heights by the mid-1970s. After years of escalating struggle by the Greek students and workers against the ruling military junta, an uprising by the students in Athens in November 1973 was soon to be joined by workers. Barricades rose up in the streets, bloody clashes between the students and workers on the one side and the army on the other lasted for almost a year, till the military junta was overthrown in the summer of 1974. In the same year, a mutiny by the Portuguese army was soon to spark a workers' revolution against the ruling fascist regime, leading to its downfall. After the revival of the working class movement in Spain in 1968, severe unrest was facing the Franco fascist regime. The escalation of social struggle was accompanied by national struggle in the Basque region led by ETA, which drew influences from the Algerian, Cuban and Vietnamese

revolutions. The movement reached new heights in 1974, given a push forward by the fall of fascism in neighboring Portugal. That pushed Franco to re-install the monarchy, which was still fascist in nature, but then the new king had to embrace a democratic transition coming under severe pressures of the workers' movement.²² The year 1975, which witnessed Franco's death, witnessed also the final defeat of the US in Vietnam.

The Regional Precipitants

The 1967 Defeat

The region was on the brink of explosion by the mid-1960s. The Arab "Cold War" was flaring between the two camps of "progressives" and "reactionaries". Even within the progressive camp, divisions existed between Nasser and his Ba'athist rivals.²³ The Arab masses by large were still supportive of Nasser, viewing him as the main agent of liberation against Israel, and US imperialism. The humiliating defeat in 1967 came as a trigger to set the entire region on fire.

Radicalizing Factors

The waves of radicalism that engulfed the globe were to have a huge impact on the Middle East region. The global radicalizing factors mentioned in the previous section were operating in the region, in addition to regional radicalizing factors, namely the Algerian and the Palestinian revolutions.

The Guevarist and the Maoist ideologies influenced the students and intellectual milieus in the region. The successes of the Vietnamese resistance was also to draw huge numbers of activists to strategies of people's war, and mass resistance *from below*. Moreover, parallels were also drawn between the victories of the Vietnamese against US imperialism and the humiliating capitulation of the Arab regimes. Also, the people's war strategy adopted by the Algerians in their revolution

against the French colonialism was to have considerable audience across the globe.²⁴

As Tareq Ismael put it: "the victory of the Algerian revolution in 1961 taught the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular to depend on themselves and to initiate armed struggle."²⁵ New communist groups started to mushroom in the region influenced heavily by Maoism along with versions of the armed struggle strategies, in countries like Tunisia,²⁶ Syria,²⁷ Lebanon,²⁸ Palestine²⁹ and Iraq.³⁰

The strongest radicalizing factor in the region was the Palestinian Revolution. Disillusioned finally by Nasserism in 1967, the Palestinians decided to take matters into their own hands. The resistance took off, after being marginal since its start in 1965. The different factions of the Palestinian revolution itself drew their inspiration from the Algerian, Cuban, Chinese and Vietnamese experiences.³¹

The 1968 *Karameh* battle, in which 300 Palestinian guerrillas inflicted a defeat on the Israeli army, was the turning point. Tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees and Arab youth volunteered to join the ranks of the resistance.³² The victories of the resistance in turn were to present a source of inspiration for the Arab mass movement, in terms of being a cornerstone for their propaganda, or in terms of armed strategies. As Jonnie 'Abdu, one of the former commanders of the Lebanese army, put it: "Before 1967, everyone used to wish to have a photo with Nasser, however after 1967, Nasser became anxious to be photographed with Abu 'Ammar [Arafat]!"³³

The Regional Revolutionary Situation and Uprisings

Shortly after the defeat, the Arab mass movement started to take off. Violent anti-western, anti-Jewish and anti-regimes riots took place in several Arab countries immediately after the defeat. In Tunisia, anti-Jewish riots spread as soon as the defeat occurred, in addition to attacks on western interests and embassies.³⁴ The movement

was soon to assume a political character, with students coming in the forefront. Strikes and demonstrations continued over the next year by the students, with support of the lecturers against state repression.³⁵ The government noted the militant intervention of communists and Maoists in the events.³⁶ It also stepped in more than once to ban demonstrations in support of the Vietnamese struggle and the French students during May.³⁷ Maoism became a dominant force in the Tunisian universities, drawing its main inspiration from the French student movement.³⁸ The radicalization reached the peak by the 1970s, to explode into a workers' uprising led by the trade unions against the government in 1978.³⁹

By February 1968 in Algeria, waves of students and lecturers strikes encompassed the Algerian universities and secondary schools over "authoritarian" issues related to state intervention in the university's affairs and police brutality.⁴⁰ These issues were similar to the ones that sparked the European 1968 events.

In Libya, severe rioting and demonstrations engulfed several major cities, where western targets were attacked after the outbreak of the war. The government crushed the demonstrators brutally, imposing a curfew. The anti-imperialist sentiments among the Libyan masses and their bitterness against their clientalistic monarchy pushed the government to demand from the US and Britain to end their military presence in the Libyan bases.⁴¹ Finally the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup led by radical nationalist officers in 1968.

In Morocco, thousands of workers under the leadership of *Union Marocaine du Travail* (UMT) carried out series of demonstrations outside the American embassy and the American cultural center following the June 1967 War. The UMT then imposed a boycott on all ships and planes belonging to countries aiding Israel in the

war.⁴² The student movement was relatively more active than the rest of its Arab counterparts. Mass strikes by university and secondary schools students were carried out during 1967-8 over issues related to the quality of education and police brutality.⁴³ The educational demands of the students were accompanied by wider political demands including "an end to the three-year state of emergency, the organization of elections and elimination of 'the economic, political and cultural interests of imperialism'".⁴⁴ The instability grew in the 1970s, with Morocco witnessing two coup attempts, followed by blood baths.⁴⁵ Then in 1978, the same year of the Tunisian uprising, an attempt to introduce austerity measures triggered massive urban unrest. The government was forced to abandon these measures in the following year.⁴⁶

In Jordan, King Hussein was forced to recognize the right of the Palestinian resistance to establish bases in his country, following his humiliating defeat in front of Israel, and the wide popularity won by the Palestinian resistance due to their heroic stand in *Karameh*. The radicalization of the Jordanian political arena as a result of the Palestinian presence was soon to trigger the contradictions of the Jordanian status quo into a civil war in 1970, known as the Black September events.⁴⁷

In Lebanon, massive anti-imperialist demonstrations engulfed the Lebanese cities following the defeat, where demonstrators attacked western embassies, banks and shops. The government called in the army to suppress the demonstrations.⁴⁸ The take off of the Palestinian Revolution following the *Karameh* battle, radicalized large sections of the Lebanese society. Massive demonstrations by the Lebanese left and Palestinians demanding the freedom of guerrilla activities in the south culminated in bloody clashes in April 1969, where the Lebanese regime capitulated to the demands of the demonstrators. Shortly afterwards the Palestinian guerrillas liberated the

refugee camps from the Lebanese military oppressive authorities.⁴⁹ The Palestinian resistance caused unprecedented level of radicalization in Lebanon, with polarization in the Lebanese society between the Left and the Right.⁵⁰ The radicalization and polarization processes went hand-in-hand throughout the 1970s, accompanied by deteriorating economic conditions, increased guerrilla activities and escalating levels of strikes, to finally trigger a civil war in 1975.⁵¹

Even Iran was not away from the radical transformations in the region and the globe. By the late 1960s, guerrilla leftist groups started to mushroom, and then fuse into two main organizations: *Fedayeen* and *Mujahedin*. Both groups drew their inspiration from the Cuban, Algerian and Palestinian revolutions.⁵² Through the course of the 1970s, Iran was to go through socioeconomic contradictions resulting from the uneven development produced by the oil boom. Contradictions exploded into mass opposition against the Shah's regime; first by the students and intellectuals in 1977; then the revolutionary process entered a new phase with the mass strikes by the Iranian working class in mid and late months of 1978⁵³. Finally the remnants of the Shah's regime were overthrown in February 1979.

Conclusion

After reviewing the global and regional precipitants, revolutionary situations and uprisings, we can notice two things. First, it is clear that students had the lead and the wider participation in the events of 1968 globally and regionally, despite the militant intervention of the working class in several countries. This was to change later in the 1970s, with the working class taking the lead in the social explosions and urban unrest. I would attribute that to the nature of students' position in the society, examined previously in Chapter II. The high mobility and dynamism of the student

movement were mainly related to the students being without overburdening "responsibilities". This is not the case with the workers, who would work at least eight hours a day, and tend to also provide for their families. The risks involved in going on a strike for a worker is, by far, larger than the case of the students. However, the students did in several countries play the role of the social detonator, radicalizing sections of the working population. The intervention of the working class in revolutionary events might be late, but it is always the decisive factor in raising the level of radicalism of the mass movement.

Secondly, it was by no coincidence that timings of the social explosions in the region occurred with those in the rest of the globe. The economic crisis was global, and so was the flow of radical ideology and political generalization. That would be apparent in the Egyptian case to be discussed in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE AWAKENING OF THE BEAST

THE EGYPTIAN PRECIPITANTS

Introduction

After discussing the global and regional panoramas, this chapter sets out to investigate the Egyptian political arena in the late 1960s. The precipitants of the revolutionary political process in Egypt started with the economic crisis in the mid-1965. The defeat in the 1967 war was to help speed up the revolutionary process, with the global and regional radicalizing factors acting as catalysts. The 1968 events in Egypt were a turning point, paving the way for the future explosions in the 1970s.

The Crisis of the Nasserite State Capitalism

The Nasserite regime embraced a Five-Year-Plan in 1961, with high ambitions of industrialization, building the High Dam, and increasing Egypt's exports. However, the basic sources of financing this plan were loans from foreign countries. Out of US\$5 billion: \$1.6 billion from the Soviet Union, \$300 million from the US and \$840 million from other countries. The rest of the funds came from the nationalized capital and from the surplus extracted from the peasantry.¹ The results were catastrophic.

Imports increased from \$229 million at the beginning of the plan to \$413 million (at 1964 prices). The trade deficit reached \$166 million; the percentage of imports as a part of the GDP increased from 15% in 1961 to 20% by the end of the plan.² The continuous decline in local investments as a source of financing the Five-Year-Plan, led the regime to depend more on external loans. Things were made worse by the crisis of the cotton crop in 1962, which led to the decrease of foreign exchange

earnings from LE121 million in 1960/61 to LE75 million in 1961/62. In addition to that, the government had to pay LE25 million to Britain and LE27.5 million to the shareholders of the Suez Canal company as compensations for the nationalization; and another LE15 million to Sudan to resettle Nubians disaffected by building the High Dam. The defense budget also was swelling during to the war in Yemen.³

In order to finance the trade deficit, the government resorted also to using its foreign currency reserves, which led to their decline from LE109 million in the beginning of the plan to only LE7 million in 1962! In May 1962, the government reached a deal with the IMF, whereby it took a loan for LE20 million and the Egyptian pound was devalued from 35.3 pt for the dollar to 43.5 pt.⁴

By 1965 the US stopped its wheat exports to Egypt, leading to general inflation in the food market reaching 11.5%. In summer 1966, the government struck another agreement with the IMF, whereby the pound was further devalued by 40%, and a program of austerity measures was to be adopted, leading to the decline in investment budget from LE383 million in 1966 to LE365 million in 1967.⁵

The 1967 defeat came as a further heavy blow to the Egyptian economy. The regime could not adopt any more Five-Year-Plans. The defense budget swallowed national resources. The ones who paid the price were the poor from the working and peasantry classes. The annual per capita consumption of wheat declined from 115 Kg in 1966 to 72 Kg in 1970.⁶ The same pattern is reflected on other basic commodities in one year 1967-8: the consumption of corn declined by 8.4%, sugar by 14.3%, oil by 14.5%, gas by 16.7% and beans by 20.9%.⁷

The 1967 Defeat

The 1967 defeat in front of Israel was a turning point for Nasserite Egypt. The defeat came as a shock for the Egyptian masses whose expectations the regime's

rhetoric was inflaming before the war.⁸ In fact the Palestinian cause was one of the main cornerstones upon which Nasser's legitimacy rested. The regime even used it for suppressing internal democracy (in the name of "unifying the internal front"). The defeat, according to former student leader Dr. El-Salamony, had cut the "umbilical chord" binding the Egyptian nation to Nasser.⁹ Nasser's legitimacy started to be put in question, and the defeat would cause a high level of radicalization in the Egyptian political arena.

The Rebirth of the Mass Movement

February 1968

Following the declaration of Nasser's intention of resigning, anti-western and pro-Nasser demonstrations engulfed Egypt, with attacks against western embassies and interests. In my view, the demonstrations were still supportive of Nasser because the sheer scale of the defeat was not clear yet. Moreover, Nasser's speech gave the impression that the US was directly involved and that the Egyptian army faced both the Israeli and the American armies.¹⁰ The public mood changed later, with more facts being disclosed everyday. In his book on "political jokes" Hammouda describes how the regime and the military establishment became subject of the Egyptian people's irony, cynicism, and mocking. The spread of jokes ridiculing the establishment pointed out to the start of erosion in the regime's legitimacy.¹¹

February 1968 witnessed the rebirth of the mass movement. Triggered by the light sentences given at the trials of the Air Force leaders, demonstrations of 10,000 workers engulfed Helwan on 21 February. The demonstrations were met by live ammunition from the police; bloody clashes and arrests occurred.¹² The major two slogans raised by the workers were "no pity for the traitors" and "there's no socialism without freedom". After a stone-throwing battle, the workers stormed the police

station in Helwan and occupied it.¹³ A conference held after the occupation raised three demands:

- 1) The retrial of the Air Force leaders
- 2) The end of the military establishment control upon the political system
- 3) The transfer of the Helwan police officers¹⁴

Students in Ain Shams, Cairo and Alexandria universities started to assemble to discuss the events; delegations of Helwan workers were sent to the students at Ain Shams and joined their teach-ins. Students demonstrations went out to the streets on their way to the public squares and the parliament. They were suppressed brutally by the riot police.¹⁵ To prevent the workers and students mingling together, the Minister of Interior blockaded the Helwan-Cairo railroad. The workers from the *Shoubra* district (the biggest industrial district in Cairo) launched solidarity strikes, and thousands joined the march called by the students of Cairo University.¹⁶ Strikes, occupations and confrontations on the streets continued for a week. Nasser declared on 25 February, that he was willing to "submit to the demands of the masses", but the students' militancy escalated. The faculty of engineering in Cairo University, which was the most advanced section of the movement, declared its demands to the government on the same day:

- 1-The immediate release of all arrested students
- 2-The freedom of opinion and press
- 3-A free parliament practicing right representation
- 4-The exclusion of the intelligence personnel and the police from the university
- 5-Issuing civil rights laws, and putting them into effect
- 6-Serious inquiry into the workers' events in Helwan
- 7-Clarifying the truth about the Air Force case
- 8-Carrying out an inquiry into the violations against the freedom of the universities, and the police assaults against the students¹⁷

It is noticed here that the demand for the retrial of the Air Force leaders came in the seventh rank; the preceding ones were all demands related to internal democracy. The strike ended on 28 February, after negotiations between the student

representatives and the parliament.¹⁸ Nasser issued the "30th of March Manifesto" promising reforms, after facing what the London *Daily Telegraph* described as "the most serious internal political struggles since he came to power 15 years ago".¹⁹

The Radicalizing Factors in Operation

The global and regional radicalizing factors were also operating in the Egyptian milieu. The martyrdom of Guevara, and the Vietnamese and Palestinian revolutions were severe radicalizing factors presenting an alternative *from below* for the catastrophic regular armies war the regime had miserably waged. The students' militant role in the French 1968 events and China's Cultural Revolution was also an inspiration for the Egyptian mass movement, though relatively less powerful than the impact of the Vietnamese and the Palestinian revolutions. The radicalizing factors teamed with the events to prepare the ground for a politically more radical movement.

Following the defeat, the regime stepped up its anti-imperialist rhetoric. The government-controlled press continuously covered the victories of the NLF against the Americans. Books were published on a wide scale discussing the glories of the Vietnamese resistance and exposing the "ugly Yankee face".²⁰ Even president Nasser himself used to cite the successes of the NLF and urge the officers to learn from the Vietnamese "miracle".²¹ The rhetoric backfired at the regime. The concept of *al-harb al-sha'abya* (people's war) became the main theme of discussion among the students and even the popular milieus. Comments were made such as: "we are not less capable than the Vietnamese," "so if the Vietnamese can do it, why can't you [meaning the regime]?" Parallels were always drawn between the successes of the Vietnamese and the failures of the regime's regular army.²² Reflecting back on the origins of the student movement, former student leader Ahmad Bahaa-Eddin Sha'aban stresses in his memoirs the role the Vietnamese "legend" played in inspiring the students:

Here there were poor and peaceful people, who were forced to face the strongest imperialist power in history. They neither retreat, bend down, nor escape from the duties of confrontation. On the contrary, they endure it with legendary patience; confront it with the genius of the nations when they struggle defending their existence; and win a victory.... We can also do that!²³

The *Karameh* battle fought heroically by the Palestinian resistance in March 1968 and the take off of the Palestinian Revolution led to radical developments in the Egyptian political arena. Over the course of few months following the battle, 20,000 Egyptians volunteered to join the *Fedayeen*.²⁴ The *Game'yet Ansar al-Thawra al-Filistinyya* (The Supporters of the Palestinian Revolution Society [SPRS]) was formed later. They were leftist-led student societies that spread in the Egyptian universities. The Palestinian cause was their main focus of propaganda and agitation, and they were to assume the leadership of the student movement.²⁵ Mahmoud Hussein described the Egyptian public mood concerning the Palestinian *Fedayeen*:

With respect to the patriotic war, popular aspirations crystallized around the Palestinian resistance. The profound admiration this struggle inspired in the masses gave them renewed confidence in the validity of mass struggle against the occupiers.²⁶

The martyrdom of Guevara was also a source of idealist inspiration for Egyptian students and fitted within the context of youth rebellion and people's war. Sha'aban describes the impact of Guevara on the Egyptian students:

... the noble 'Guevarist' model of self-sacrifice, leaving all the joys of life, and the seduction of power positions, to reply the call of the revolution, and fulfilling the duties of a true revolutionary. That stood against *thawryye el-makateb* (office revolutionaries), *el-monadeleen el-rasmeyyeen* (official militants),²⁷ and those who traded in theories and principles.²⁸

A song by Sheik Imam²⁹ titled "Guevara is dead" spread like fire among students and activists.³⁰ The song describes Guevara's death holding his gun in the forest, contrasting it to those "who speak all the time and do nothing", in reference to

the Arab regimes and the "intellectuals". Hussein also noted the influence of Guevarism on the rising Marxist circles in 1968.³¹

The French May events and the Cultural Revolution played a part in the radicalization process, though not as strong as the previous factors mentioned above. Former student leader Abbass El-Tonsi attributes this to the lack of information about the events. The government-censored media rarely covered the events, and presented them as a conflict over reforming the educational system. However, he confirms that they did have an impact on the rising Marxist organizations in 1968, influencing their strategy, tactics and ideology.³²

November 1968

The Nasserite regime tried laboriously to contain the mass movement following the February events. In his "30th of March Manifesto" Nasser promised to deliver reforms and respond to movement's demands. However, nothing much was achieved. The "rank and file" elections of the ASU were met by indifference from the public. The plebiscite's result was 99%; the bodies subject to elections were devoid of real power; and even the plebiscite turnout results were declared to be 100% in villages before the voting started. Growing distrust prevailed among Egyptians towards the official policy³³

The regime also "embraced" the Palestinian resistance, namely the *Fateh* group, declaring its "support" for the Palestinian revolution. Hassanein Heikal, former editor-in-chief of *Al Ahram* and Nasser's "man behind the scenes", claims that Nasser's aim was to prove to the world that "the Palestinian people still existed, alive, and participating in the defense of their land and cause".³⁴ On the contrary, Hussein viewed such "embracing" as means to appease the Egyptian masses.³⁵ Hussein's view is also supported by Marshal, who points out to the role of *Fateh* and other Palestinian

organizations in "saving the faces" of the Arab regimes following the defeat and its role as a means of controlling the Palestinian immigrant communities in the Arab countries.³⁶ The Egyptian regime tried to separate between the Palestinian struggle against Zionism and the case of Egypt, claiming that the first should adopt armed struggle, but the second involves diplomacy. Indeed diplomatic maneuvers were carried out by the regime, though quietly, in order to achieve a "peaceful solution", through the UN mediator Jarring.³⁷

With the growing alienation from the government and with the increase in confidence after the February events, the Egyptian mass movement developed politically. One of the gains of the February revolt was forcing the regime to hold students' union elections. They were won primarily by the leaders of the February revolt. Moreover, the regime attempted laboriously to conceal all information about the numerous mass demonstrations demanding arms that occurred, and about the popular attempts to secure arms in secret or by force. That is in addition to the spread of public debates among the peasantry about the urgency of organizing popular resistance even in the remotest villages of the Upper Egyptian countryside. Instead, the regime's main propaganda focused on the necessity of strengthening "internal unity".³⁸

Discontent mounted, exploding in November of the same year. The events were triggered by government "reforms" in the secondary education. Strikes and demonstrations against the new laws by school students in *Mansoura* were met by live ammunition from the police. Four students were killed, leading to eruption of the city demanding democracy and the resignation of the minister of interior.³⁹ Strikes, demonstrations and university occupations started to take place in solidarity with the *Mansoura* students. The Alexandria University this time was in the lead of the events.

Students demanded the resignation of the minister of interior and democratic reforms. But criticism started soon to be directed for the first time against Nasser in person. Slogans were chanted accusing Nasser of being a "butcher," "liar" and a "coward who is afraid of Dyan [Israeli minister of defense]".⁴⁰ Moreover, in an act, which clarified the development of the political consciousness of the movement, the students in Alexandria distributed thousands of leaflets calling for a revolt by university, secondary school students and all citizens of the city, linking "for the first time... between the regime's policies of internal repression and external capitulation".⁴¹

Strike committees were elected in the universities, raising demands related to civil liberties, freedom of expression, and the "establishment of a state of *institutions* instead of the [present] state of *security agencies*". The students occupied printing presses in their universities and used them for printing leaflets. Committees of publicity, security and food supplies were formed. The university campuses were open to the citizens who wanted to join the students, and indeed great numbers of school students, nurses and citizens flocked to the campuses. Political wall-magazines and teach-ins spread in the university campuses. The government responded by surrounding the universities. In Alexandria, helicopters, tanks and live ammunition were used against the students and the citizens demonstrating in their support. The surroundings of the Alexandria University campuses turned into battlefields between the demonstrators and the police and the army. Inside the faculty of engineering, the students set up a local radio station. The government responded by cutting off the electricity from the university, so the students used a generator to continue broadcasting statements and revolutionary songs.⁴²

The students' rebellion continued for nearly one week until the students ended their occupation after long negotiations with the faculty members,⁴³ and out of

weariness from the brutal oppression and the heavy rains.⁴⁴ However, the government cracked down on the student leaders, arresting 46 for more than a month and half.⁴⁵

The Rebirth of Egyptian Communism

The year 1968 witnessed another important political development: the rebirth of the Egyptian communist movement. Several factors played a role in revitalizing Egyptian communism. Ismael and El-Sa'id cite the 1967 war defeat and the disillusionment by sections of communists of their collaboration with Nasser.⁴⁶ However, in my point of view, the revitalization has to be interpreted in the following context. For the first time in years, there was a considerable section of the Egyptian public that was interested in leftist ideas. This emerging interest was due to a number of factors. First came the revitalization of the workers' and students' movements. Secondly, due to the disillusionment with Nasserism, a vacuum in the Egyptian political arena was created, which the Left could intervene in and fill. Thirdly, the "successful" models in front of the Egyptian public at that time were mostly "leftist" in essence: the communist-led Vietnamese resistance, Guevarism, leftist-led national liberation movements in Africa and Asia, and the Palestinian resistance which drew heavily on leftist ideologies.

The new movement came mainly from three sources: firstly, communist circles started to regroup composed mainly of militants, who originally accepted the dissolution of the party in 1965.⁴⁷ Secondly, a group of old guards communists who originally refused the dissolution of the party, but were marginalized. With the revival of the mass movement, they were back in action under the name of the "Egyptian Communist Party- 8th of January". Thirdly, and most importantly, came the radical faction of the new communist movement, that was composed mainly of the young

student militants who took the lead in the 1968 events. Later, that third faction would develop into the EWCP.⁴⁸

Conclusion

1968 was a turning point in the history of Egypt, with the awakening of the beast, which was dormant for nearly 16 years: the mass social movement. Several remarks should be taken into consideration when reviewing the events.

Both explosions in February and November were spontaneous in nature; there is not any evidence of subjective pre-planning by any group or party. However, the November events exhibited an increase in the level of organizational effectiveness and political consciousness compared to the February events, despite the short span of time between them.

The February revolt did not put forward any radical demands, and focused more on series of general reforms. Though spontaneous, many of the student leaders belonged to the OSY that was part of the regime's Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Also although the students rebelled against the regime, they still moved within the framework of its organization.⁴⁹ Finally, it's important to note that the criticism leveled by the students was directed against certain figures of the regime (mainly the Minister of the Interior Sha'arawy Gomu'a), but not against Nasser himself.⁵⁰

The November 1968 events were a step forward for the Egyptian mass movement, and demonstrated a more effective political development of the anti-regime militancy. Firstly, the events transcended organizationally the boundaries and the framework of the OSY, unlike the February events. Secondly, the consciousness of the mass movement reached a new level, whereby criticism was directed primarily against Nasser, not just against some members of his own regime. Thirdly, the

"confrontational" mood of the masses was on the rise, as a result of the rising discontent against Nasserite regime repression measures. Indeed, the regime's hysterical response against the demonstrators symbolized the extent of political crisis it was facing. The government conscripted many student leaders in the army; used the army to crush demonstrators, killing 15 demonstrators and injuring 500; engaged in a continuous 72 hours exchange of fire with the Israeli army at the Suez Canal to distract attention away from the internal events;⁵¹ and blamed 'Israeli traitors' for leading the demonstrations.⁵²

1968 had also another important significance. The reemergence of the students' and workers' movement came after a generational gap. The 1952 coup had frozen the class struggle in Egypt through repression and reforms.⁵³ Also the communist movement had dissolved itself, so it was not in touch with the new generation of radicals. Even those who refused the movement's dissolution were marginalized and it took them relatively long time to link with the reborn movement. The young activists almost started building their struggle from nil. There was no tradition that could serve as a basis to build on. Moreover, as El-Guindy noted, these young activists looked suspiciously at the old-guard communists who dissolved their party.⁵⁴ In my view, the 1968 events gave these new radicals the chance for trial and error. The students started developing techniques and tactics that were to be their major means of struggle in the 1970s: wall-magazines, teach-ins, marches, galleries, leaflets and conferences.

Despite being spontaneous, the movement also increased the level of organizational consciousness of the students. That was clear in the November events: organization of the strike committees and its sub-committees of publicity, security and food supplies, and the sophisticated use of means of communications (the local radio

stations). That would give birth later in the 1970s to more efficient national organizational structures in mass mobilization. 1968 paved the way for the latter struggles in the 1970s under the Sadatist regime, in terms of ideology, cadres, militancy, strategy and tactics

The late 1960s events were the Egyptian part of the global radical panorama. The radical tendencies and movements that swept the world at that time had a great effect on the Egyptian movement, with the global and regional radicalizing factors influencing the newly born movement. A fact that was not denied even by figures from the establishment. Foreign minister Mahmoud Riad described the November events as a "part of 'world disease'".⁵⁵ The questioning of global and local political systems was also at the core of the Egyptian, regional and global explosions:

The student revolt reflected the specific conditions which determined the concrete situation of each country. However, an awareness of the revolt's character as a worldwide phenomenon with worldwide implications bringing into question a worldwide structure was inescapable. Whether in Cairo, where it focused on the necessity of resuming the war against Israel; in Rome and Paris, where it raised the problems of the violent revolutionary road in opposition to the road of parliamentary idiocy; or in the black ghettos of the United States, where it transformed an already authentically revolutionary struggle into urban guerrilla warfare, this revolt everywhere had certain common characteristics foreboding irreversible revolutionary upheavals....⁵⁶

CHAPTER V

THE FESTIVAL OF THE OPPRESSED

THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION, TRIGGER AND UPRISING

Introduction

This chapter is devoted to examining Egypt under Sadat in the period leading to the uprising. The focus would be on the objective factors in terms of the situation of the economy and the status of the regime. Subjective factors, such as the political actors, would also be examined, with a particular focus on the students', workers' and communist movements. The chapter will also examine the nature of the events themselves that occurred during 18 and 19 January 1977.

The Revolutionary Situation

Sadatism: A Counterrevolution or an Intensified Post-1967 Nasserism?

Sadat's overthrowing of his opponents in May 1971 is perceived by many as a start of a "counterrevolution" against Nasserism, and an anti-thesis of the Nasserite era. Sadat is criticized by the proponents of such a view for his political and economic policies. In the political sphere, he is blamed for moving Egypt into the American camp, isolating it from the Arab world, compromising with the Arab Gulf "reactionary" regimes, and finally the peace with Israel. On the economic level, he is viewed to have swept away the "socialist gains" the Egyptian people won under Nasser, restoring "parasitic" capitalism in Egypt by his open door policy and restructuring the Egyptian economy in a tendency to cut or eliminate social welfare.¹

Contrary to the view mentioned above, Sadat's policies came as an intensified and accelerated continuation of his predecessor's regime. The seeds for Sadat's so called "counterrevolution" were laid in the post-1967 Nasserite policies. Following the defeat, divisions started to appear within the bureaucratic-military elite controlling the regime. It is wrong to portray these divisions as a bureaucratic war, or power struggle. Rather they were two tendencies dedicated to preserving the status quo, and to maintaining the capitalist system; their main differences were concerning the strategy to do so. The first tendency favored economic liberalization and letting loose the hand of private capital; while the second favored the maintenance of state capitalism and the continuation of traditional policies of public control.² On the overall however, the Nasserite regime tended to move hesitantly in the footsteps of the first tendency.

At the political level, the rapprochement with the Gulf regimes started under the auspices of Nasser himself. Following the 1967 defeat, a settlement was reached with Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen. Moreover, the radical "anti-reactionary" propaganda launched by the regime was stopped in exchange for financial aid from the Saudis.³

The process of peaceful settlement with Israel was also launched by Nasser. Coming under strong pressures from below, Nasser declared the "war of attrition" on the Israeli forces in Sinai, aiming mainly at co-opting the mass radicalization that started in February 1968.⁴ However, simultaneously, secret indirect talks started with the Israelis through the American channel and there were attempts of rapprochement with the Americans themselves. With the start of the "war of attrition", Nasser sent his advisor for foreign affairs, Mahmoud Fawzi, to the US to:

... remind the American leaders that Egypt was ready to compromise and that if only Washington would contain Israeli reprisals during the war of attrition within acceptable limits, the war could then be transformed into prelude to peace negotiations. From this time on, Nasser's message to the Americans leaders was that the outcome of the emerging confrontation depended essentially on them.⁵

Through several mediators and messengers, Nasser tried to enhance his relations with the US despite the mutual distrust.⁶ The process culminated in the acceptance of the "Rogers' Initiative" by Nasser, which caused a stunning impact and denunciation across the Arab world, and in Egypt. After a series of emissaries going back and forth between Washington and Cairo, Nasser and Israel agreed on Rogers' proposals that stated:

The warring parties in the Middle East declare and implement a limited cease-fire for the time period of 90 days. During that period ambassador Jarring will work to put into effect Security Council resolution 242, specifically [the articles related to] *reaching an agreement for permanent and just peace, based on mutual recognition, sovereignty, unity of lands and political independence*; and [in exchange] Israel would pull its forces from lands occupied in 1967 War. (My emphasis)⁷

The Egyptian chauvinism flared by Sadat during his reign, and his isolationist policies regarding the Arab world, were also based on a tendency adopted by Nasser with the start of the peace negotiations. In order to minimize the radicalizing impact of the Palestinian Revolution on the Egyptians, and to condition the public opinion to accepting the peaceful settlement, Nasser's propaganda machine started to spread the feelings of "Egyptian superiority" by:

... emphasizing the "primordial" role of the Egyptian army in the anti-Israeli Arab front, the propaganda began to invoke Egypt's "decisive responsibilities" in the struggle, owing to its position in the Arab world, to the sacrifices- "by far the greatest"- that it had made for the war... The object was to impress on people's minds the idea that Egypt alone had the right to define the overall policy of the Arab world...

Within the strictly Egyptian context, finally, official propaganda tended to praise the "Egyptian patriotic fiber," recalling that although Egypt had always gone "to the rescue" of its Arab brothers -in Algeria, in Syria, in Yemen- it had never been paid back; that it had received nothing but "ingratitude" from them;

that at the present stage nothing would be easier than for Egypt to win back the Sinai, abandoning the other belligerent Arab nations to their fate, but that it refused to do so, despite the sacrifices demanded of it, because it was responsible for the fate of the whole Arab world.⁸

At the economic level, the seeds for the *Infitah* policy were also laid in Nasser's macro-economic policies in the late 1960s. The contradictions of state-capitalism discussed in Chapter II, the catastrophic economic results of the Five-Year-Plan; in addition to the 1967 military defeat directed the regime towards economic liberalization and austerity measures.

With the end of the Five-Year-Plan, Nasser appointed Zakaria Mohiee-Eddin as a Prime Minister, replacing the "leftist" Ali Sabri. Mohiee-Eddin engaged in a laborious attempt to reach deals with the IMF and the US, whereby austerity measures would be taken regarding the Egyptian economy. His appointment was not a coincidence: Mohiee-Eddin was known of having "right-wing" inclinations, favoring economic liberalization; his background as a Minister of Interior was a qualification for providing the "security" measures needed to pass such reforms. Also that was a message to the US denoting Egypt's sincere intention of moderation and adoption of concrete liberalizing procedures.⁹

By September 1966, Nasser replaced Mohiee-Eddin by Engineer Sedki Suleiman. The new cabinet contained 13 new ministers from professional technocratic backgrounds, expressing Nasser's bid for moderation, liberalization, and containing the "ideological socialist elements" among the ruling class. The liberalizing scheme moved in two directions following the defeat: a) reviving the private sector; b) "reforming" the public sector.¹⁰

The private sector was encouraged to step again into the market after providing legal assurances. The regime assured private capital that there would be no

more expropriation or nationalization. Moreover, it started in 1969 returning nationalized private interests to its original owners. Sectors of investments, monopolized previously by the state, were opened to the private initiatives, like exporting cotton, vegetables and fruits. The share of private capital, in export and import trade, soared from LE8,500 in 1965-6 to LE47,900 in 1969-70.¹¹

The Nasserite policies towards the public sector laid a tradition that was picked up later by Sadat and in fact it constituted the core of Mubarak's Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP). Criticism was directed at the prioritizing of the social and political aims compared to the economic ones.¹² Attempts were made in 1968 to restrict university admission¹³ among other cuts in social services. The public sector was subject to a two-fold strategy. Firstly, separating the management from the production process, aiming at making the public sector firms function separately from the state bureaucracy on the financial and managerial levels. Such strategy resembles the deregulation process adopted currently in the ERSAP. Secondly was liquidating the firms with heavy losses or low profitability that were constituting a heavy burden on the economy.¹⁴

Sadat's rise to power constituted a triumph for the "moderate" wing of the Egyptian ruling class. His policies are not contradictory to the post-1967 Nasserism, though he tried to portray them in that fashion. The divisions within the ruling class were brought to the forefront in May 1971.

The triumph of Sadat upon his opponents in May 1971 did not settle down the divisions within the ruling class. Tensions continued between the two factions; one headed by Sadat embraced the liberalizing scheme passionately, while others still upheld the traditional Nasserite line, favoring change in a less accelerated rate in the field of politics and economics, including:

A stratum in the Foreign Ministry that was not pleased with Sadat's policies [regarding the US and Israel]; in addition to leaderships loyal to Nasserism in the public sector, which was subject to successive changes and severe attack; in the associations' movement and union federation; and forces within [the ruling] Egypt Party that viewed the power booties to be not distributed fairly among the loyalists.¹⁵

The Student Movement 1972-3

Several factors intervened to freeze the student movement following the November 1968 rebellion. The war of attrition absorbed some of the public frustration, and showed the "seriousness" of the regime in fighting Israel. Then came the death of Nasser, succeeded by Sadat's rise to power, which created a state of "let's wait and see" among the Egyptian public. But soon, the student movement would explode again in January 1972.

The period of 1970-late 1971 was setting the ground for the revitalization of the movement into an increasing radical phase. The Rogers Initiative froze the fighting along the Suez Canal, which increased the frustration of the Egyptian masses, especially with the Nasserite new tendencies for a peaceful settlement. The Black September massacres in Jordan were also to increase the level of radicalization among the Egyptian mass movement.¹⁶ Nasser's passing away was also another factor. Despite the disillusionment with Nasser following 1967, he was still a charismatic leader who was feared and respected by many Egyptians, even among a considerable stratum within the new young activists.¹⁷ His successor was not able to "fill the vacuum" in the eyes of many Egyptians, lacking his charisma, appearing in a "caricaturist"¹⁸ way in many cases with his "weakness, hesitation and incompetence".¹⁹ That would give more self-confidence for the mass movement concerning its ability to confront the regime.

Hostility towards the regime started to increase with Sadat's peace initiative in February 1971. That was followed by Sadat's purging "extremist" elements within his regime that were in support of a conventional war against Israel. Sadat's moves in this direction signaled his new compromising tendency towards the US and Israel.²⁰

At the same time, changes were occurring within the students' milieu. Leftist currents were gaining an increasing ground within the student movement. Marxist organizations laboriously attempted, with relative success, at recruiting cadres among the student leaders.²¹ The phenomenon of wall-magazines kept on spreading, creating a highly politicized atmosphere. The wall-magazines discussed all sorts of issues, "starting from the defeat and the preparation for war, to the question of democracy, [including] the daily and syndicate problems of the students".²² In addition, leftist-led student societies kept on mushrooming, most notably the SPRS, *Gawad Hosni*, *Abdallah 'l-Nadeem*, *Masr* and *Abdel-Hakeem El-Garrahi*.²³ These societies focused on solidarity activities with the Palestinian Revolution, trying to transfer the Palestinian model into the Egyptian context, producing literature and organizing events related to the militarized economy and people's war.²⁴

In the summer of 1971, the student movement achieved a great victory, by issuing and executing a resolution whereby the university security guards units were abolished.²⁵ The universities became "liberated zones".²⁶ That was accompanied by landslide success of the Left within the student unions' elections within Cairo University, with a program related to civil liberties.²⁷

Sadat announced that 1971 would be the "decisive year", referring to the preparation to launch the war of liberation sometime that year. Everyone waited; nothing happened. On the 13 January 1972, Sadat delivered a speech, justifying his

"postponement" of the war, by the "Indian-Pakistani fog," referring to the war between these two countries, emphasizing the Soviets' inability to aid Egypt in the war since they were busy with aiding the Indians. His speech triggered the student rebellion once again.²⁸

On 15 January, wall magazines spread all over the universities criticizing and mocking Sadat's speech. After two days, a conference was held in the faculty of engineering at Cairo University, called for by SPRS and *Gawadd Hosni*. Great numbers of students attended. The conference issued a statement calling for:

- 1) Arming the masses, so as to be able to take their leading role in solving their national question and liberating the land
- 2) Condemning the [attempts to negotiate] peaceful settlement and the no-peace-no-war status
- 3) Severing all ties with American imperialism
- 4) Closure of the university for a month to seriously train the students in military warfare²⁹

In an attempt to implement these recommendations, the conference formed three committees for civil defense, political awareness and communications³⁰

Similar events occurred in other universities in Cairo and other governorates.³¹

On 19 January, another conference was held at the faculty of engineering at Cairo University under the title "discussing the issue of preparing the internal front for war". After a hot discussion with the ASU youth organizer, who failed to convince the students with the regime's arguments, 2,500 students declared a strike and occupied their faculty. The first national committee was elected containing Ahmed Bahaa-Eddin Sha'aban, Seham Sabri, Mohamed Abu-El-Wafa and Kamal Khalil. The four leaders were Marxists. At the evening of that day, the strikers took over the printing press at their faculty, to make copies of their statement, calling for an expanded conference on the following day. Banners with revolutionary slogans were raised inside the faculty and around the university.³²

On the following day, the Higher National Committee of Cairo University Students (HNCCUS) was elected, with the leading figures connected one way or another to the Left.³³ The HNCCUS called for a marsh. Around 10,000 students assembled demonstrating against the regime and calling for war. The marsh stormed the Festivals Hall in the university, holding the "first general national students conference". Action committees were formed, and a delegation was elected to meet Sadat. However, he declined.³⁴ The same night, the Azhar student union held a conference declaring:

We believe in the military solution as the only road to liberating the land. We refuse any concessions or compromises concerning a single inch of our Arab land. There will be no concessions in regards to the Palestinian people, no matter what the cost of the sacrifices is.³⁵

The occupation at Cairo University continued till the students won the recognition from the University Chancellor that their legitimate representative was the HNCCUS. Sadat refused to meet the students, so they decided to issue a statement explaining their aims, in what was known as the "January Document", and to go out on a marsh on 23 January. However, on the morning of the marsh, a delegation from the People's Assembly (PA) arrived, and engaged in negotiations with the strikers. The two parties agreed on canceling the marsh, instead a delegation of 250 students would go to the PA headquarter to have a discussion with its members.³⁶

The meeting did take place, and the PA agreed to publish the January Document in the newspapers and broadcast it on the radio after slight modifications. Upon reaching that agreement, most of the strikers went home, with a minority staying still inside the university. However, with the fall of the night, the radio did not broadcast the document, instead it announced the closure of the university. By dawn,

the Central Security Forces (CSF) stormed the university, and arrested great numbers of students.³⁷

On the following day, students started to flock to their university, to find out that their colleagues were arrested, and their campus was closed with large security enforcement surrounding it. Confrontations between the CSF and about 3,000 students aided by some members of the public broke out when students tried to break in the police cordon and enter their university.³⁸ By 2 P.M. the students started marching to *Tahrir* Square, where they were joined by Ain Shams students, workers and other citizens.³⁹ The union of writers, intellectuals and artists issued a statement in support of the students and the HNCCUS.⁴⁰ Then the artists organized a demonstration starting from Riche café heading to *Tahrir* Square to join the strikers. A provisional HNCCUS was elected to run the occupation.⁴¹ El-Tonsi, who was one of the members of the committee, recalls the wide support and sympathy shown to the occupiers by the people in the neighborhood, supplying them with food, drinks and cigarettes. Teach-ins were all over the square, with students and workers discussing issues related to social justice, people's war, US imperialism and the Palestinian cause. The regime sent several army officers who engaged in discussions with the students attempting to discredit the idea of a people's war and the Vietnamese model and explaining why the Vietnamese model could not function in Egypt.⁴²

The square was occupied for one day. Finally the CSF and Special Forces stormed the square, resulting in bloody clashes.⁴³ Demonstrations and street clashes continued during the day, with more than 10,000 students and members of the public battling their way to the presidential palace. Sadat blamed SPRS for "conspiring" against the internal stability of the country, and blamed a "minority of deviants" for

instigating the events.⁴⁴ Tens were arrested and detained in the Citadel Prison. Professional syndicates held conferences declaring their solidarity with the students.⁴⁵

The student demonstrations continued over the course of the year. The regime cracked down hysterically, with hundreds of students being arrested.⁴⁶ In addition, the regime formed Islamist student organizations, encouraging them to attack and sabotage the students' activities on campuses.⁴⁷

With the outbreak of the war, the student movement was frozen temporarily. In a way Sadat weakened its *raison d'être*, by responding to its cornerstone demand which was "war". That blew up one of the driving forces of the movement. However, the war transferred the movement to a new level. Student leaders do admit that the war decreased the momentum of the movement, however it added a new dimension for it. There had been an increasing tendency, then, for giving more attention to the "social" question, since the "national" question was relatively solved. The process was aided by the growth of influence of Marxist organizations among the students,⁴⁸ and the formation of the Progressive Socialist Thought Club (PSTC). It was a grass-roots student organization that substituted the HNCCUS, with a clear Marxist leadership and program, drawing inspiration from the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese Left during the Civil War.⁴⁹

The PSTC was most famous for its ideological sophistication, wide impact on the students' milieu, and its continuous attempts to unify the movement through coordination with the Nasserites. The PSTC's biggest achievement was the "Society and University Week" during 20-27 November 1976, which Sadat considered later to be the dress rehearsal of the 1977 uprising. The PSTC militants led a massive demonstration heading for the PA on 25 November, submitting to the officials a

statement that included a number of demands related to internal democracy, civil liberties, social justice, rejection of collaboration with US imperialism, rejection of peace with Israel, and support of the Palestinian Resistance.⁵⁰

The Infitah

The October War gave a breathing space for the regime, relatively improving Sadat's public legitimacy and creating a bigger room for maneuvering. The structural adjustment program could not be postponed any longer, with the deteriorating economic conditions.

The *Infitah* was an attempt by the Egyptian regime to solve the crisis of funding for its development plans, suffered since the 1960s. *Infitah* was the regime's master strategy to attract foreign capital, especially Arab capital, which witnessed a boom due to the dramatic rise in oil prices. However, with limited foreign investment flow into Egypt, the structural crisis of the Egyptian economy remained. The main pillar the regime depended upon for survival was its oil exports and Western aid, resulting from the start of the peace process and the emerging alliance with the US.⁵¹

The *Infitah* laws included concessions to foreign and local capital, including the prohibition of nationalization and expropriation of invested capital, tax evasions, scrapping social security laws regarding minimum wages and bonuses.⁵² In the field of agriculture, the PA endorsed new laws that scrapped the Nasserite agrarian reforms, raising the rents and facilitating the evictions of peasants out of the land in favor of the landowners. Despite the efforts, foreign investments did not "rush" into Egypt as the regime expected, rather as Shoukri noted, most of the investments were directed to "consumerist" projects for a small elite stratum and they did not solve the structural problems of the Egyptian economy. These foreign-financed projects included Nile cruise ships, restaurants, tourist transport and five-star hotels.⁵³

American and Western aid became the main economic constituent for the regime. In 1970, the national debt had reached \$1.3 billion, constituting 18% of the GDP. The figures jumped to \$13 billion in 1977, constituting 95% of the GDP.⁵⁴ However, the impact of *Infitah* was mostly felt in terms of prices and standards of living. The prices of basic commodities kept on increasing dramatically following the war, despite the government propaganda that kept on raising the masses' *value expectations*, attacking the "closure" period under Nasser, drawing a "rosy" picture of the wealth that was going to flow into Egypt.⁵⁵ The price of a kilo of meat increased from 62 pt in 1970, to 135 pt in 1973, then to 140 pt in 1976. The general prices of meat, fish and eggs increased by 122% from 1973-76; jumping again by 25.2% from February 1976 to February 1977. The prices of fruits increased by 65% from 1973-76; then again by 25.5% from February 1976 to February 1977. The prices of vegetables increased by 110% from 1973-76; then again by 15.5% from February 1976 to February 1977. As for the dairy products, their prices increased by 109% from 1973-76; then increasing again by 14.7% from February 1976 to February 1977.⁵⁶

The economic *Infitah* was also accompanied by a political *Infitah*, in terms of domestic and foreign policy. At the domestic level, the regime allowed the formation of *manabir* (platforms) within the ASU, as a forefront for the formation of political parties for the first time since 1952. Parliamentary elections were held in 1976, where the "government party" won the majority of seats in the PA.⁵⁷ Sadat's increase of the margin of liberties was linked to several factors. First was the attempt to contain the mass movement that was pressuring from below in the direction of sociopolitical change. Second, with the increasing socioeconomic gap between the ruling class and the rest of the society, a portion of representation had to be granted to the masses so as

to preserve the status quo. Finally, the regime attempted to create a liberal façade to stress the stability Egypt, to be able to attract western investments.⁵⁸

At the foreign policy level, following the eviction of the Soviet advisors in Egypt prior to the war, Sadat laboriously tried to get close to the US and the Western camp following the war, and engaged Egypt in a process of peaceful settlement with Israel. The 1975 "disengagement" agreement was the first time where direct negotiations took place between the Egyptian regime and Israel, setting forward the framework for a permanent peace.⁵⁹ That move was to cause further alienation of the masses from the Egyptian regime.⁶⁰

The Strategy and Tactics of Egyptian Communism

Communist organizations continued to mushroom and grow over the course of the 1970s, in a process that started back in 1968 as discussed in the previous chapter. The scope of analysis in that chapter would be limited to the two most important organizations: the ECP and the EWCP.

Some of the communist circles that started to regroup in 1968 united to reestablish the ECP on 1 May 1975.⁶¹ The reestablishment of the party came in a context of an escalating level of industrial struggle, as will be discussed in the next section. El-Guindy, who is one of the leading cadres in the ECP, viewed the reestablishment as a historical necessity at that time, in order to:

... face up the counterrevolution, and defend socialism as an objective, in addition to defending and developing the achievements of Gamal Abdel-Nasser... [and]... struggle against dependency on America and submission to the American plans...⁶²

However, in my view there had been two other factors involved in the reestablishment of the ECP. Firstly, the Egyptian-Soviet relations were deteriorating at that time, with Sadat's attempts at allying with the American camp. The Soviets

must have found it necessary once again to have a striking arm within the Egyptian political arena, a need that was non-existent during Nasser's time in the 1960s. So I would assume there had been a green light from Moscow, if not a direct order, calling for the reestablishment of the ECP. Secondly, I think there was a level of opportunism involved in the ECP old-guards-leadership's decision. The new line adopted by the Sadatist regime in the field of politics and economics meant that the communists were not needed any more in the ruling alliance. The old guards, who dissolved the party in 1965, were granted privileges and leading positions within the ASU and the VO under Nasser. That was the case no more under Sadat, with the continuous purges he carried out within the state organs following May 1971. Hence, the old guards communists viewed reestablishing their party as a prerequisite to be effective actors once again in the political arena.

The ECP's ideology was still heavily Stalinized. The stages theory and popular frontism were still the two main pillars of its strategy and tactics. In the internal bulletin of the ECP, the secretariat denied the existence of a homogenous Egyptian ruling class. Instead, it claimed that the regime was composed of three heterogeneous elements:

[The first] has become traitorous and clientalistic. [The second], due to the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie, seeks compromise with imperialism, and laboriously attempts to reach a midway solution with it, dreaming of becoming its minor partner in the region. [The third] still believes in the patriotic Nasserite line.⁶³

Hence the task of the party was to struggle against the traitorous wing in the regime, to contain the vacillating centrist wing, and finally to support the "patriotic" elements within the regime. Moreover, the party warned against the "call for overthrowing the regime" as a leftist adventurism".⁶⁴

The ECP also laid a special emphasis on the "national democratic front" which is in essence a Stalinist popular front encompassing "all patriotic and democratic forces". When reading the memoirs of El-Guindy, the main emphasis of the front and party tasks were on "national" issues related to anti-US imperialism, anti-Zionism and achieving "national economic independence".⁶⁵ Among the nine party objectives outlined in its reestablishment manifesto, there was only one talking in general about the "continuation of the struggle to achieve the daily economic demands for the masses of workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and toiling masses".⁶⁶ The rest of the objectives were related to "national" causes: the Palestinian cause, Zionism, US imperialism and Arab unity.⁶⁷

The consequence of such strategy was to cause an ideological disorientation among the party militants about the position to be taken towards the regime. Class collaboration was at the core of ECP political line, with class issues marginalized for the "sake of the country". Moreover, the party regarded Sadat to be the representative of the "patriotic" wing to be supported in the regime! When Sadat traveled later to Jerusalem in November 1977, the party dropped its "three wings" theory, and replaced it by the "parasitic/productive capitalism" theory, whereby the Egyptian bourgeoisie was divided into two factions: parasitic capitalists, who should be fought, and productive capitalists who should be supported.⁶⁸ The vacillation in the party strategy towards the regime would affect its credibility in the eyes of the Egyptian public, not to mention the possibility of disorientation among the party militants.⁶⁹

The EWCP was founded in 1972. The party was the most radical among the communist milieu in Egypt, composed mainly of young activists.⁷⁰ It considered the earlier dissolution of the communist movement as a fatal mistake, viewing the

Nasserite regime as "bourgeois bureaucratic", and the Sadatist regime as a continuation of its predecessor. It denounced the Egyptian regime rapprochement with the US and Israel, determining the party objective as "the revolutionary overthrow of the Egyptian bourgeoisie".⁷¹

Despite the radical posture, the EWCP's still moved within the framework of Stalinism. The party still adopted the stages theory, with an elitist view towards the masses. There were contradictions in the EWCP ideology: on the one hand it called for the revolutionary overthrow of the Egyptian bourgeoisie; but on the other, it postponed the organization of a socialist revolution, because of the "relative weak weight of the working class and its allies within the masses".⁷² Such contradictions and elitist conception of the mass movement would lead the party to embrace reformism and electoralism, omitting the strategy of revolutionary socialism, calling for the establishment of "parliamentary democratic republic", and engaging in the parliamentary elections with reformist demands.⁷³

Both parties, in one way or another, fell into the trap of reformism as a result of their Stalinist disorientation. That would have serious consequences on their performance during the 1977 uprising, as discussed later. There are no accounts of course of the size of their membership due to their underground nature. However, their class composition was clearly not proletarian. Their influence extended to "the politicized [segments of] intellectuals, students, some worker-leaders and numbers of petty bourgeois [elements]"⁷⁴ It is also worth noting that the EWCP was very strong among the students' milieu, in fact it had the strongest influence comparatively to other communist organizations.⁷⁵

The Rise of the Workers' Movement

The students spearheaded the mass movement from 1968 till 1973, but finally the Egyptian working class started to intervene strongly into the political arena. Prior to 1975, there had been some important industrial strikes. They were related to "economic" demands, however they reflected an anti-regime militancy and an implicit politicization process that started to engulf the Egyptian working class.

In August 1971, 30,000 workers went on strike in Helwan Steel factory.⁷⁶ Their demands were "economic", related to wage increases and improving the work conditions.⁷⁷ There had been signs that the workers' political and organizational consciousness was developing. A strike committee was soon elected to run the factory. Union bureaucrats were branded "government clients". Besides the economic demands, the workers were hostile to intervention of the governmental bodies in the affairs of the factory. The regime cracked down on the strikers arresting around 3,000 workers. As soon as the news reached *Shoubra 'l-Kheima* industrial district, thousands of workers took to the streets demonstrating against the repression of their comrades. The government coerced them using the police and army reinforcements.⁷⁸

Three months after these events, the Cairo Taxi-drivers went on strike. They organized a sit-in at their union headquarter, against the imprisonment of nine of their fellow Taxi-drivers. The drivers expressed hostility to the union officials loyal to the ASU. The regime's response was also to suppress the strike and arrest 100 drivers, increasing later to 149 drivers.⁷⁹

Frustration with the economic conditions and regime's repression was on the rise. In March 1972 thousands of workers from *Shoubra 'l-Kheima* went on strike calling for raising minimum wages, granting of sick-leaves and fixing the working hours. It is evident here that their demands were "economic". However, for the first

time in post-1952 Egypt, the workers assembled waiting for the passage of the Prime Minister on his way to *Shebin 'l-Kome*, to shower his car with stones. As usual, the government cracked down on the strikers, arresting 76.⁸⁰ In the same year, 6,000 workers in Alexandria port went on strike protesting the refusal of the management to pay the over-time. The regime arrested four strike-leaders. The response of the workers was impressive: storming the police station to free their comrades. The government and the management finally succumbed to the workers' demands.⁸¹

The outbreak of the October War froze the movement for a year like in the case of the students. However, the militancy of the working class was now on an unstoppable rise, especially after it became clear that their gains were threatened by the *Infitah*, in addition to other political factors that were causing further alienation from the regime including police repression, and the start of the negotiations with the Israelis.

The year 1975 was the turning point. In January, thousands of workers occupied their factories in Helwan, demanding the decrease of the gaps between the level of wages of workers and managers. Workers in *Shoubra 'l-Kheima* went on strike in solidarity with their comrades in Helwan. Two months later, in March, 27,000 workers in *Shoubra 'l-Kheima* stopped work once again.⁸² This was followed by a militant workers' rebellion in *al-Mehalla 'l-Kobra* in the same month.

More than 30,000 public sector textile workers went on strike in *al-Mehalla*, and occupied their factory demanding fair wages, protecting the rights of workers who were conscripted earlier in the army and improving the conditions of industrial safety. The regime's response to the strike was hysterical. The CSF surrounded the city, fighting air-jets flew over the factories, terrorizing the population. However, the regime's terrorizing procedures backfired, causing a high level of radicalization

among the workers. Thousands of private sector, textile and service workers, relatives of strikers and students took to the streets in massive demonstrations, chanting anti-regime slogans, and labeling the workers as "*fedayeen*". Workers also stormed managers' houses, taking out crystal chandeliers and expensive clothes hanging them on the trees, streetlights and phone cabinets beside cartoon models of black bread and rugs to clarify the class differences. No incidents of sabotage occurred. Inside the factories, the workers took over production in what Shoukri described as a "workers' commune". Committees of workers' self-management were formed to run the production for three continuous days. The regime cracked down ruthlessly on *al-Mehalla* workers, massacring 50 and arresting 2,000 militants.⁸³

In the following month, sugar factory workers in *Naga' Hammady* went on strike.⁸⁴ Moreover, tensions spread among Alexandria textile factory workers.⁸⁵ Finally, the year ended by a massive strike carried out by Port Said arsenal workers.⁸⁶

The year 1976 was more or less a dress rehearsal for the 1977 uprising. The conditions of the economy can be best described by the Finance Minister announcing that 1975 had been the "worst economic year in the history of modern Egypt". The Prime Minister called for more austerity measures and seeking the help from "Arab brothers".⁸⁷ Egypt was on the brink of an explosion. Violent confrontations took place between strikers and police forces in Damiette, during March, when workers demonstrated to demand the unpaid wages of 18 days of work. The regime, under pressure, released the arrested workers and responded to their demands. In May workers in a military factory went on strike and occupied the factory because of a conflict related to wages and work conditions. The workers exhibited a high level of militancy, refusing to negotiate with the Minister of Defense who arrived in the company of large police enforcement. Moreover, the workers threatened to blow up

the factory. The minister succumbed at the end to the workers' demands. In the following month, thousands of autoworkers went on strike demanding their share of profits.⁸⁸

The strikes spread to most of the industrial centers, with workers stopping work at light transportation factory in Helwan, Misr-Helwan Textile factory, El-Sharqyya Tobacco Company, the Naval Arsenal in Alexandria and Port Said. Events similar to *al-Mehalla* "commune" occurred in *Kafr 'l-Dawwar*, with factory-occupations and violent confrontations leading to the injury and death of many workers. These clashes were accompanied by an uprising in the city of *Manzallah* against police brutality, popular raids and storming of police stations in *Shoubra Elkheima*, *El-Sayyeda Zeinab* and *El-Darb El-Ahmar* protesting against police brutality. Finally, in a move that clearly showed Sadat's eroding legitimacy, Cairo public transport workers went on strike in less than 24 hours following the presidential re-election of Sadat in a sham referendum whose results were 99% "Yes", causing life in the city to come to a complete halt for 2 days!⁸⁹

The Trigger

On the night of 17 January 1977, Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Abdel-Moneim El-Qaissouny gave a speech in the PA on the present economic status of the government. He was followed then by the Minister of Planning who presented the annual socioeconomic development plan; then finally the Minister of Finance presented the general government balance for the 1977 financial year.⁹⁰ The procedures included in the three officials' statements meant a direct increase in the prices of several commodities, eliminating around LE277 million worth of subsidies. The basic commodities had the lion share of the eliminated subsidies, around LE205.6 million.⁹¹ The impact of the statements was immediate expression of anger among the

poor and workers' districts, with "citizens and workers assembling in some quarters of Alexandria, Cairo and especially in the industrial district of Helwan on the night of the 17th."⁹²

The Uprising

The Start of the Events

On the morning of 18 January, news of the reduction or elimination of subsidies spread through the radio and newspapers. The public started to feel the direct impact of the rise in prices, whereby the prices of gas, oil, cigarettes, sugar, bread, rice, macaroni and taxi fares increased.⁹³ The uprising started.

In southern Cairo, Helwan workers took the lead. Before 9 A.M. thousands of workers in Misr-Helwan textile factory went on strike, and got out on a demonstration that toured the industrial quarter. Workers from other factories, especially those in the military factories, joined quickly. Slogans were chanted against the price increases, calling for overthrowing the government, expressing hostility and bitterness towards Sadat and his family. According to the police reports, the demonstrations were mainly led by workers who were known for their Marxist inclinations.⁹⁴

Simultaneously, workers from *Shoubra 'l-Kheima*, in northern Cairo, went on strike, occupied some of their factories, putting the production on hold. In Delta Steel Company, workers publicized a statement sent to President Sadat saying: "the proletariats at Delta Company thank you for increasing the prices, raising the slogan 'more increases in prices for more hunger and impoverishment'". Students at the faculty of engineering in Ain Shams University held a conference denouncing the price increases. Then they got out on a demonstration, joined by students from other faculties, heading to the PA to express their rejection of the new procedures. When passing through *al-Geish* Street, they were joined by women from the popular

districts. Civil servants and Cairo University students joined the demonstration at *Tahrir* Square, together with demonstrations coming from southern and western Cairo. These human waves headed mainly to the PA, chanting anti-regime slogans. A delegation of students entered the PA to present the demands of the masses. When they did not come back for a long time, women headed an attempt by the demonstrators to attack the guards, thinking that the delegation was arrested. The police attacked brutally the demonstrators, so they spread into smaller demonstrations in Garden City and other districts.⁹⁵

In Alexandria, demonstrations exploded at 9 A.M., under the leadership of the Naval Arsenal workers. They were joined quickly by workers from neighboring factories. The demonstrators spread through the streets of the city, heading towards the universities quarters, where thousands of students came out to join the marsh. Demonstrations, strikes and confrontations spread to *Mansoura*, *Quena*, Suez, Aswan and most of the urban centers in Egypt.⁹⁶

It was clear that the most organized sections of the workers' demonstrations were located in Cairo and Alexandria, where there was a leftist influence. These sections were the ones who started agitation for the events. Demonstrations were accompanied by strikes and sit-ins. Moreover, in some cases there were attempts of fraternizing with the soldiers. Mohamed El-Guindy notes that demonstrators in *Tala'at Harb* and *Urabi* square engaged in discussions with the soldiers of the CSF related to the price increases, attempting to win them on their side.⁹⁷

The Violence

Two days before the uprising, the minister of Interior addressed the PA, commenting on the riots and confrontations between the citizens and the police that occurred in the small city of *Billa* in Delta: "the presence of the CSF with its weapons

in any place raises the tension of the situation."⁹⁸ Despite this remark, the Ministry of Interior mobilized thousands of CSF soldiers to suppress the demonstrators on 18 January. Indeed, one of the witnesses of the events confirms that:

Until the night of 18 January, the demonstrations were peaceful. However, suddenly, around 7 P.M. and after series of confrontations with the CSF, the events in some places turned into violence and sabotage.⁹⁹

One of the magazines, close to the presidency then, reported on the incidents of violence:

Attempts were made to cut railway lines between Cairo and Alexandria, when demonstrators put large numbers of burnt tires on the lines. Such an act led to the burning of line connections for a long distance. Saboteurs also set *Kobri Lamoun* station on fire, causing stoppage of suburbs' trains. Demonstrators in Giza succeeded in cutting railway lines between Cairo and Upper Egypt, by putting railway bars and broken streetlights on top of the railway lines.¹⁰⁰

The magazine added that:

The demonstrators destroyed the main gas station in *al-Galaa* square; destroyed part of the Sheraton Hotel; set fire to *Imbaba* Railway Station and to the trains transporting the crops to the warehouses. In addition to that, demonstrators set the casinos in *al-Haram* Street on fire, completely destroying *Arizona*, *Nadi 'l-Leil* and *Operge* [nightclubs]. In downtown Cairo, the demonstrators attacked the headquarters of the [ruling] Egypt Arab Socialist Party in *al-'Attaba* and burnt its contents. They also tried to storm the police station [in the area], smashing its windows. Moreover, demonstrators set part of Opera Casino on fire, smashing front windows of shops in the square. One of the demonstrations succeeded in reaching the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior. The CSF responded by live ammunition and tear gas to disperse it... In *al-Geish* Square, demonstrators set tires on fire inside shops.¹⁰¹

In Alexandria, demonstrators set the headquarters of the ASU on fire in *Menshiyya* district. While in Suez, demonstrators tried to set the railway station on fire, causing the movement of trains to come to complete halt. They also attacked police station in *al-'Arba'aen* district, seizing control of the arms and ammunition.¹⁰²

Despite the outbreak of violence on the night of the 18th, the advanced sections of the working class came back to the forefront and took the lead on the following day, 19 January. In Giza, around 7 A.M., workers of the night shift in *al-Shourbagy*

Textile factory in *Imbaba* delayed their leave, so as to meet workers coming on the morning shift. The workers assembled and decided to strike, heading to other factories in the area to encourage them to join their demonstration. Workers headed to *al-Sharq* Wool factory, to fraternize with its textile workers. The demonstration grew in size, heading to the *Amirryaa* print shops in the same area.¹⁰³ Around 8 A.M., workers of the first shift in Synthetic Silk Company and Military Factory no. 45 went on strike. They assembled, then got out on a demonstration. Means of transportation stopped between Helwan and Cairo, after big rocks, taken from the street pavements, were put on the railway bars. The police dispersed a demonstration by Helwan workers in front of the railway station that lead to the factories, so the workers marched to the city center. Also, in the same morning, workers from *Sugat* Factory went on strike, and started demonstrating in the streets of *Hadayek 'l-Kobba*. Shortly afterwards, demonstrations engulfed the whole city, with the demonstrators attacking and storming government institutions, especially police stations, security agencies, public and private transports, five-star hotels, casinos, and banks. Several bloody clashes took place between the police and the demonstrators, in order to prevent them from seizing arms stored in the police stations.¹⁰⁴

By the afternoon, demonstrations were still spreading. Large numbers of workers and students assembled in *Tahrir* Square, heading for the PA, refusing police orders of dispersing. Similar militant demonstrations occurred in *al-'Attaba*, *al-Darb 'l-Ahmar* and *Sayyeda Zeinab*. Consumer Societies in several areas were also attacked.¹⁰⁵ Part of the demonstrations headed to presidential *'Abdeen* Palace. The crowd spontaneously attempted to fraternize with the soldiers chanting: "my brother army soldier; your people are barefooted and wearing coarse clothes!"¹⁰⁶

In *al-Giza* Square, bloody clashes took place between the police and the demonstrators, turning the square into a battlefield.¹⁰⁷ The Giza demonstrations headed to the president's house, which was near Cairo University. Students chanted anti-government slogans, criticizing Sadat himself, calling for the resignation of the government since the "Egyptian people are not in need of a government which steals their bread!"¹⁰⁸

By the night of 19 January, the regime cancelled its decrees that triggered the events and ordered army units to descend to the streets to crack down on the demonstrations. Such a two-fold tactic caused a drastic impact on the events, leading to the retreat of the masses. However, the uprising did not stop till the morning of 20 January, as police reports noted that:

Demonstrators continued to assemble and move in *Imbaba* district. The crowds kept on attempting to attack the forces when they tried to confront them. These crowds were concentrated in *Kit Kat* and *al-Mounira* [districts]. During that time, around 5 P.M. of that day [19 January] the demonstrators set two trolleys on fire, sabotaged the office of the Manager of *Kit Kat* station. The clashes between the crowds and the police continued till 2 A.M. of the following day, 20/1/1977.¹⁰⁹

One of the newspapers also reported on 20 January, that:

Violent demonstrations continued in Cairo and Alexandria yesterday till late at night. Many [demonstrators] were killed and injured, in addition to the arrest of hundreds.¹¹⁰

The Sabotage

A memorandum by the Egyptian police on 18 and 19 January events stated that fire broke out in *al-Shourbagy* Textile Company factory in *Imbaba*. However, the memorandum also pointed to the factory workers' role in "controlling and extinguishing the spread of the fire in cooperation with firefighters."¹¹¹ That scene, in addition to others, points to the concentration of sabotage in the poor neighborhoods, slums and downtown. There were almost no reports on sabotaging incidents in the

industrial districts or the main universities in Cairo and Alexandria. On the contrary, there were several reports on attempts by workers and students to stop sabotaging operations. One of the newspapers reported on 20 January that "most of the demonstrators in the morning of the previous day were youth. Students and workers tried without much success to stop incidents of looting and theft."¹¹² That is confirmed by Shoukry, who stated that:

Not a single national university, institute or a school was sabotaged. No factory was sabotaged and no machine was destroyed... Demonstrators even found time to move a simple wooden carriage that belongs to a food-seller into a safe sub-street for fear of damage.¹¹³

Several observers and witnesses have pointed to the wide active participation of the minors in the looting and sabotaging incidents. One of the journalists wrote:

On 19 January, I had to go home from... [work]... on foot, passing through *Tahrir* Square and *Qasr 'l-Einy* Street. All the way down the road there were battles between tens of minors and the security forces.¹¹⁴

A French journalist who witnessed the events wrote:

Small children wearing dirty *gallabyys* appeared unnoticed by the soldiers. Suddenly the children started throwing molotov cocktails at the tanks, and ran screaming. Soldiers started to shoot, but the children disappeared.¹¹⁵

A leftist who participated in the uprising describes the minors' behavior: "As soon as the [CSF] wagons would pass, thousands of children, who appear from the middle of nowhere, would shower them with stones and rocks."¹¹⁶ El-Guindy recalls that when he was passing through one of the streets in Cairo, "there were lots of children throwing rocks at the cars. When they saw my car, they stoned it too."¹¹⁷ *Al-Ahram* noted that in southern Cairo 15% of the arrested were minors of less than 15 years old; and 20% minors of less than 18 years old. Also the percentage of students among the minors were less than 10%.¹¹⁸

The Regime in Crisis

Commenting on the uprising, Shoukri describes the crisis of the regime in a metaphoric way: "the regime spent the night during 18 and 19 January in the open space. The old regime stayed in its place, only because no one stepped in to fill the power vacuum."¹¹⁹ The regime appeared hesitant, unconfident and confused in front of the uprising.

The splits within the regime's front started on the night of 17 January upon the announcement of the resolutions in the PA. Members of the ruling party declared their opposition to the government decrees, criticizing its content and its approval before being presented to the PA. Some of them even went as far as criticizing the general policies of the regime as a whole.¹²⁰

On the night of the following day, 18 January, and under the pressure of the workers' militancy, the executive board of the EGFLU met to issue a statement against the decrees, declaring that it "rejects with complete determination the price increases decrees in form and in essence, calling for their reversal".¹²¹ This statement is significant since the EGFLU is not a labor union in the proper sense of the term; rather it is the government arm within the working class. During the events it was headed by the Minister of Labor in the cabinet that issued the decrees in the first place.

In Upper Egypt, President Sadat was spending his vacation in his winter rest house in Aswan. Despite the early reports confirming the restoration of calm and stability, Sadat saw by his own eyes angry demonstrations heading towards his rest house. Immediately, he "rushed out leaving behind him everything even official papers".¹²² As soon as Sadat left Aswan by his plane, rumors spread that he fled to Sudan, seeking refuge in Numeiry's regime. After several hours, Sadat's plane landed in an unknown place. Heikal confirms that the regime was in a state of confusion, with

the Prime Minister requesting from the Minister of War Abdel-Ghani Elghamasi the rushing of the army into the streets. However "Marshal El-Ghamasi initially rejected the idea of the army participating in suppressing the demonstrations."¹²³ As a result, the police was not capable anymore of controlling the streets. The Central Security in Cairo "told every governorate: depend upon yourselves... we don't have a single policeman, or an ambulance we can aid you with."¹²⁴

The Minister of War did not approve the sending of the army to the cities, except after a personal request from President Sadat himself, and after the reversal of the decrees. On the evening of 19 January:

The army started moving, preceded by continuous announcements on the radio and TV that the president has ordered the reversal of the recommendations of the Economic Group, which led to the price increases. The clear coincidence between that announcement and the sending of the army into the streets points to an important point. *That coincidence points, even if implicitly, to the fact that decision makers were not sure of the soldiers' stand if they descend into the streets to confront the demonstrations while the price increases' resolutions were still in effect.* (My emphasis)¹²⁵

Indeed, foreign newspaper reports pointed to:

... the demoralization felt by the army troops stationing around Cairo due to their suppression of the demonstrations, the thing which forced the government to withdraw battalions from the troops stationing at the frontline with Israel.¹²⁶

The Role of the Communist Left

Abdel-Satter El-Taweela, one of the Egyptian intellectuals, wrote that "the events of 18 and 19 January have taken by surprise all the political forces, even the government party. Thus no organization was capable of controlling or directing its [i.e., the events'] spontaneous movement."¹²⁷ Reviewing the events confirms such conclusion, especially concerning the communist organizations.

The previous analysis does not negate the fact that several leftist militants and sympathizers participated in the uprising. There were several reports that noted the

Marxist leadership of demonstrations and strikes by workers¹²⁸ and students.¹²⁹ Also the only leaflet that appeared during the uprising was produced by the PSTC, the forefront of the communist students in Cairo University. Titled "Let's unite against the government's decrees"; the leaflet declared that "we have no option now but to continue with iron will our strikes and demonstrations, presenting the government with two options, either to succumb and cancel the decrees, or to resign."¹³⁰ Moreover, many of the slogans chanted by the demonstrators during the uprising were essentially leftist, such as: "we are the people with the workers; against the alliance of Capital", "hey thieves of *Infitah*; the people are starving and are not comforted"¹³¹, "America! Take back your money; tomorrow the Arab people will step on you", "we are the people with the workers; against the government of exploitation."¹³² In fact, the slogans raised during the uprising, were the same slogans chanted in the universities by the students in the preceding years.¹³³ Needless to say that the students' movement from the end of the Nasserite period till 1977 was mainly leftist-led.

The organizational and agitational tradition established previously by the Left influenced the mobilizational efforts to a great extent. The heading of workers' and students' demonstrations towards the PA was an enlarged playback of the demonstrations of Helwan workers and Cairo University students led by the Left in 1976 towards the same destination. In addition, I suggest that attempts of fraternizing with the soldiers and the slogans chanted, playing on the tunes of their [i.e., soldiers'] class oppression, were directly or indirectly launched by the Left. But that is not all.

"Although members of leftist organizations were here and there trying to intervene in and direct the spontaneous movement... their impact was weak."¹³⁴ Indeed, the organizational presence of the Egyptian Left in the uprising was extremely

weak, a fact admitted by organizations themselves. The organ of the EWCP, *al-Intifad*, expressed in the issue of 5 March 1977 a self-criticism of the party's performance in the uprising:

Our party did not efficiently manage to plant roots within the popular classes. That's why it was absent from the task responsibilities of organizing and preparing for the people's uprising, on 18 and 19 January, which was a violent rebellion against the government economic decrees.¹³⁵

El-Guindy recalls in his memoirs: "although I did not participate in the demonstrations that broke out on 18 and 19 January, I was among the arrested. That was the case with most of the arrested [militants]"¹³⁶ Sa'ad confirms the previous view: "From the organizational side, [the uprising] was mostly independent from the Left (apart from the initial students' and workers' demonstrations)."¹³⁷

The crisis of the Left's inability to relate to the uprising was not only caused by its organizational absence, but was also due to ideological orientations that prevented it from grasping the nature of the events. The Left's intervention exhibited a level of opportunism, aiming at getting some political gains through self-promotion. It failed to grasp the spirit of the uprising, which was "overthrowing the Sadatist regime".¹³⁸ The Left did not put forward the call for overthrowing the regime, despite the escalation of anti-regime confrontations and protests within the students' and workers' milieus in the preceding years. As for the radical Left, represented by the EWCP, it confined itself to reformist demands that were far below the potentials of the uprising.¹³⁹

One of the ECP leaders declared that: "Our party neither raised the slogan of overthrowing the regime, nor called for it. Our position on the regime is clear. We are struggling against the *clientalistic wing* inside the regime... Our main struggle is focused on the formation of the widest front of patriotic and progressive forces [the ECP leader's emphasis]."¹⁴⁰ Shoukri comments on the ECP's declaration that "one

can't help but get astonished by such analysis, announced after the events".¹⁴¹ The Secretary General of *al-Tagammu'* party [the legal cover of the ECP] emphasized the previous view in an interview with *Roza 'l-Youssef* magazine. He denied any connection between his party and the events, and denied its leadership of the demonstrations, citing the following incident as a proof:

On Friday, 19 January, I read about a popular marsh called by one of our committees in the governorates. So we sent direct orders prohibiting this marsh, so that it wouldn't be used by intruders. The order was indeed executed.¹⁴²

A review of the position of the communist Left in the uprising shows that the organizations featured "a weak existence at the start of the uprising. Then the organizations tried to direct the uprising in the direction of protest within the framework of the Sadatist regime during 18 January. Finally, they withdrew from the field when the uprising reached its peak, deserting it, while it engaged in its last battles without them [i.e., the organizations] at the end."¹⁴³ Shoukri put it more clearly: "the organized Left, both underground and legal, was not up to the level of the historical event. It stayed behind before [the uprising] occurred, and after it occurred."¹⁴⁴

Conclusion

It is clear that the events that occurred on 18 and 19 January 1977 came as a climax for an escalating social struggle *from below* by the Egyptian mass movement in the preceding years, rather than being an outburst of a riot without any context. However, the communist Left failed miserably in pushing the struggle forward into the seizure of power due to their organizational and ideological drawbacks.

There are important remarks that have to be emphasized. As with the global and the regional cases, the uprising was preceded by a radical social movement that was mainly headed by students. The working class came to the forefront of the

movement in a later phase. However, once they stepped in, the workers transferred the movement into a new more radical and militant phase. Moreover, as also the case with the mass strikes in the region and internationally, workers tended to start their movement focusing on "economic" issues related to work conditions and wages. With the advancement of the movement, implicit politicization started to take place. In the case of Egypt, the absolute control of the regime over the production process and labor unions helped to flare the anti-regime militancy. Workers were striking over bread and butter issues. However, when they struggled, they engaged directly against "government" appointed managers and "government" appointed union officials, "government" security forces. That helped to fuse the "economic" with the "political" dimension.

The main justification the regime and its agents branded the events as a "mob riot" was the issue of violence and sabotage, but there should be some reservations made here. Firstly, the violence started at the hands of the CSF; the masses' violence was a response. Secondly, workers and students -the pillars of the demonstrations- were not the main social forces that led the sabotaging. Thirdly, the sabotage was mainly carried out by "outsiders" such as minors and elements from the lumpen proletariat, those who do not occupy a position within the production process, and lack industrial discipline, unlike the case of the proletariat. Fourthly, the main targets of sabotage were not randomly chosen, in fact they reflected a high level of class-consciousness. Police stations are the symbol of oppression, where citizens are subject to brutal treatment. The government institutions and ruling party headquarters are symbols of the regime, which the people are rebelling against, so it is natural to target such institutions. Shoukri adds that:

[The masses targeted] night casinos, grand hotels and rest-houses of high officials, because of all what they symbolize of social injustice, and double-

standard morals; [and they targeted] consumer associations that contain their [i.e., the masses'] food that is already looted by the bureaucracy and brokers.¹⁴⁵

Subject to attacks were also public transport buses and trams, which were daily "torture chambers" for the Egyptian public, where millions get "squeezed" everyday in these "sardine tins" on their way for and back from work. The private cars were also targeted as symbols of class distinctions. Shoukri cites a story:

The masses held a mock trial of the comedian Fouad El-Mohanndess on *Abu-'l-'Ela* bridge between the aristocratic *Zamalek* district and *Boulak* slums. Their only question to him was "how could you afford to get this?" pointing to the posh car he was driving, while they can't even find a place in the bus.¹⁴⁶

The alienation felt by the demonstrators from the private and "public" property around them is brilliantly described by the journalist Sabri Abu 'l-Magd who asked one of the boys who were destroying cars passing on one of the bridges: "why are you burning your country?" The boy answered: "It's not my country! It's the country of others!"¹⁴⁷

CHAPTER VI
THE LOST REVOLUTION
THE GLOBAL
REGIONAL AND EGYPTIAN COUNTERREVOLUTION

Introduction

The existence of a global, regional and Egyptian revolutionary situation did not bring about the revolutionary change desired by a large section of the rebellious masses. Two factors played the most important role in disrupting, or even reversing the revolutionary situation. First are the maneuvers of the capitalist governments that included the use of their coercive power against the uprisings. That was in addition to maneuvers related to granting reforms in order to diffuse the revolutionary situations. However, such counterrevolutionary measures could have been trespassed, if it wasn't for the second factor, the negative impact of the Stalinist legacy. The revolutionary party that can organize the masses, centralize their power, provide a school of strategy and tactics for the proletarian revolution, and present the workers with the "memory of the class" was absent in virtually all the cases. Stalinism, as represented by the "communist" parties globally, played a major role in containing the mass discontent, and channel it towards a reformist line, in order to maintain the status quo, or caused vacillation for the movement that led it easily to fall into the hands of *ancien regimes*, or petty bourgeois parties that restored the capitalist system, with different banners.

Global Counterrevolution

The levels of violence and backlash against the Left by the capitalist governments were horrific. Marcuse draws a vivid picture of the global counterrevolutionary violence launched against the Left:

The Western world has reached a new stage of development: now, the defense of the capitalist system requires the organization of counterrevolution at home and abroad. In its extreme manifestations, it practices the horrors of the Nazi regime. Wholesale massacres in Indochina, Indonesia, the Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Sudan are unleashed against everything which is called "communist" or which is in revolt against governments subservient to the imperialist countries. Cruel persecution prevails in the Latin American countries under fascist and military dictatorships. Torture has become a normal instrument of "interrogation" around the world. The agony of religious wars revives at the height of Western civilization, and a constant flow of arms from the rich countries to the poor helps to perpetuate the oppression of national and social liberation.¹

In the US, the government resorted to assassination of black leaders and used force to crush the Ghetto uprisings, smash student occupations, and suppress anti-war and civil rights demonstrations.² At the same time, the US ruling class adopted a containment policy towards the Black Nationalist movement. Its adoption of the "affirmative action" program, whereby reforms were granted to the movement, leading to the creation of a black "middle class," with a stake in maintaining the system, that would act as a diffuser for the militancy of the movement.³ The division of the mass movement into issue-oriented factions (blacks, feminists, gays, greens and others) without a centralized party that could bring all these issues into the forefront of the struggle, linking them in terms of theory and practice, and mobilize the mass movement against the core cause of oppression which is the capitalist system, ultimately led to the collapse of the "rainbow" coalition. The movement was epitomized, giving rise later to "identity politics", which caused further disintegration and schism. That facilitated for the US government to contain the "leaders" of the mass movement and integrate them within the system, paving the way for right-wing attack on social and political rights under the Reagan administration in the 1980s.⁴

The same tactic was used by British imperialism in Northern Ireland, where the British launched an armed suppression campaign against the Republicans.⁵ At the

same time, concessions were made to the "leaders" of the movement, leading to the rise of a Catholic "middle class", pushing the movement into electoralism,⁶ which finally led to the capitulation of the IRA and the start of the peace process in the 1990s;⁷ in absence of a revolutionary party that could unite Catholic and Protestant workers against British imperialism, and Unionism.⁸

In France, the government used sheer coercion against the movement. De Gaulle found no way out of the crisis, but to disappear and fly to the French army bases in Germany, where he was promised direct army intervention against the uprising.⁹ However, he was saved by the French Communist Party (FCP), whose leaders did their best to disrupt the revolt. They attempted laboriously, without much success, to isolate the workers from the students' radicalism. Finally, after striking a deal with De Gaulle, the FCP ended the general strike, ordering the workers to go back to work, signaling the end of the uprising.¹⁰ Reforms related to wages and civil liberties were granted to diffuse the revolutionary situation.¹¹ However, the dismal failure of the Left, would lead later to a counterattack by the Right. The fascist National Front was established in the early 1970s, soon it grew and became a mass party building upon the demoralization and disillusionment with the Left. The FCP entered a phase of long term decline in terms of roots within the working class and political influence. Free market economics were embraced wholeheartedly by both the Conservatives and the Socialists marking an era of "liberal consensus".¹²

In Germany, where the movement depended upon students, the Left collapsed with the end of students' struggles at the beginning of 1970s. Maoist organizations, which were relatively strong, suffered from splits and schism with every twist and turn of the Chinese ruling class. The movement was further separated from the

working class. Out of despair, a section resorted to armed struggle forming Baader-Meinhof. The government found no difficulty in killing and jailing most of its militants by the late 1970s. It also used the "terrorist threat" to crack down on organizations from the far Left. Finally, the German Left ended tragically, by the collapse of Maoist groups, adopting electoral strategy, while other sections of the movement resorted to Green politics.¹³

In Latin America, the US was active supporting military coups, launching what was known later as the "Dirty War" against leftist guerrillas. In 1976, under the auspices of the CIA, the intelligence services of several Latin American countries launched "Operation Condor" targeting communist dissidents.¹⁴ The results were horrific, including assassinations of activists in Europe,¹⁵ "disappearance," torture, execution and child abduction of hundreds of thousands of "communist subversives" in the continent.¹⁶

However, the defeat of the Left was not only the result of the genocidal policies of the fascist regimes, but was also caused by the Stalinist legacy the Left was trapped in. Across Latin America, Guevarism based on the doctrines of Che and his French associate Regis Debray, inspired tens of thousands of youth to join guerrilla organizations, and adopt armed struggle as a strategy. But, that had disastrous consequences. As we mentioned in Chapter I, Guevarism is characterized by a great dose of voluntarism. In several cases of Latin American countries, the objective conditions for a revolution were not present during the armed "campaigns". Also, the guerrilla *focos* were isolated from the workers' movement, which facilitated its smashing by military campaigns in the rural areas.¹⁷ While the other traditional CPs confirmed completely to popular frontism, refusing to adopt revolutionary strategy against their regimes, most notably was the case of Chile, where the vacillation of the

Chilean CP in the revolutionary situation facilitated the paralysis of the movement and the suppression of the workers by the CIA-sponsored Pinoche coup in 1973.¹⁸

In Italy, the state launched a brutal terror campaign against the Left, workers and students. The security agencies were given green light to employ Mussolini-style political repression against strikes, demonstrations and college occupations. Moreover, the state adopted a "strategy of tension," whereby, fascist groups, in coordination with the secret services, would carry out terrorist operations, and the blame would fall on communists or anarchists. The state would then use the public scare crack down on the Left.¹⁹

Italian Stalinism, represented by the Communist Party of Italy (CPI) also played a central role in the working class defeat. The CPI leadership was anxious by all means to be part of the ruling bourgeois government, following the principles laid by Stalin in the 1920s. It subjugated its militants and the working class movement towards such electoral goals, instead of intervening in the mass struggles of the Long Hot Autumn.²⁰

In the face of the crisis the ruling conservative right-wing Christian Democratic Party (CD) "turned to the PCI for support in exchange for a promise that if they behaved as a responsible national party they might one day become part of government."²¹ The PCI seized the opportunity announcing the need for a "historic compromise". The party attempted laboriously to persuade the workers into accepting the restructuring policies of the Italian state that would produce cuts in their living standards, in exchange for sharing power with the CD.²² Not only that, but also the PCI stepped in to disband strikes, persuade students to end college occupations, support even the police repression of students and workers' demonstrations, wholeheartedly embrace the anti-terror laws enacted by the government to crack

down on leftist groups,²³ giving uncritical support for anti-strike laws and the remaining of Italy in NATO!²⁴ It's no wonder then that the movement was tragically defeated and the Italian Left would soon start to disintegrate by the beginning of the 1980s.

In Britain, the main forces controlling the labor movement were the Labour Left, trade unionists and the CP. In the first half of the 1970s, these forces had no choice but to ride the tide of the escalating industrial struggle. However, they tried their best to extend their hegemony and subject the movement to their electoral strategies. After series of sell outs and disruptive behavior against the mass strikes, the movement collapsed by 1975 with the world recession hitting Britain, though there had been some important strikes by the late 1970s.²⁵ That opened the door for the growth of fascism and latter the rise Thatcher who cracked down on the labor movement and the welfare state.

In Portugal the CP was the strongest force among the rank and file workers' movement. With the outburst of the revolution, the CP's strategy was as Stalinist as its counterparts in Europe. The party opted for:

[H]olding back workers' struggles in exchange for positions in the existing state machine, then had used these positions to squeeze out the old bourgeoisie, establishing state capitalism.²⁶

The CP intervened to call off mass strikes, denouncing workers' struggles as "fascist plots," causing severe vacillation of the movement, and disarray among militants. That facilitated a counterrevolution by sections of the establishment, under the banner of Social Democracy, disarming workers and revolutionary units within the army and smashing workers' organization.²⁷ A similar situation occurred in Greece, where the communist movement was vacillating between Eurocommunism

and pro-Russian Stalinism. Where a clear revolutionary leftist alternative was absent, the reformist Left led by PASOK was able easily to exert its control on the uprising.²⁸

In Spain, the CP had also the upper hand among the workers activists. However, its objectives were neither the revolutionary overthrow of fascism nor the establishment of workers' power:

Their whole political method was based on doing political deals with forces to the right of them, on the one hand, and using the crudest, bureaucratic, Stalinist methods to control the workers' organizations on the other.... The Communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, was prepared to blunt his own members' militancy in order to placate 'liberal' monarchists, 'democratic' ex-fascists, 'progressive' employers and, of course, the Socialist Party leadership.²⁹

Despite the employers' offensive and fascist attacks, the CP recognized the monarchy and started to discourage and disrupt strikes. That facilitated diffusing the revolutionary situation, and ensuring a smooth transition from fascism to "democracy", despite the potentials for a much more social radical transition.³⁰

The Western revolutionary situation ended by the late 1970s, due to the joint efforts of state repression and Stalinist sell outs, opening the door for the rise of the right and the far right in the 1980s.

Regional Counterrevolution

The case of the Middle East was almost similar to the case of the West. The revolutionary situation was also diffused by the regime's brutal coercion and the sellouts of the CPs, leading to the growth of the Right in the late 1970s and 1980s.

In Iran, the Stalinist and Guevarist political traditions of the Left disabled it from relating to the mass movement that emerged in 1978, leading to a catastrophic defeat. The ineffectiveness of the pro-Moscow *Tudeh* and the two guerilla organizations was the result of the substitutionist and elitist traditions each had inherited. Instead of opting for independent organization of the Iranian working class,

which engaged in mass strikes, the Left substituted the workers by the "progressive bourgeoisie", the peasants, the petit bourgeoisie, and armed struggle as the forces of social change. As a result, except in the few cases, the Left could not relate to the mass strike movement. The guerillas were up there in the mountains and the forests waging their armed campaign for a decade, therefore, when the workers in the cities moved, they were unable to relate to them.³¹ Moreover, because of its Stalinist popular frontism, the Left gave away the leadership of the movement by its alliances with the Islamists, uncritically supporting Khomeini as an "anti-imperialist". That led to the Islamists filling such a power vacuum, and assuming the lead of the movement.³² Counterrevolution was launched by the Khomenites against the workers, smashing popular organizations (*shora* councils and neighborhood committees) that involved large scale massacring of the Left. Iranian capitalism was kept intact.³³ The triumph of the "Islamic Revolution" would give boost to Islamism in the Middle East.

In Tunisia, the Bourgiba regime launched a repressive campaign, during the 1970s, against the Left and the trade unions that involved arrests, torture and assassinations. The 1978 uprising was also crushed by the army, using helicopters, tanks and live ammunition against the unarmed workers, followed by sweep arrests and trials of trade unionists, leftists and workers.³⁴

The performance of the Tunisian Communist Party (TCP) did not differ from that of its Stalinist counterparts in the rest of the world. During the 1960s, there had been strong tendencies within the party calling for its dissolution, since "socialism", meaning the state-capitalist policies followed by the regime under the name of "Tunisian Socialism", was already established. Though the party was not dissolved, it continued to follow a Stalinist line in terms of calling for popular fronts, stressing on nationalism, and postponing the socialist revolution for the sake of the bourgeois

national democratic revolution.³⁵ The TCP abandoned the notion of workers' power and revolution, sticking to clear reformist demands related to nationalizations in the field of industry, providing social reforms, and stressing the necessity of "national" unity for the implementation of "democracy".³⁶ The party was legalized by the regime finally in 1981 and was allowed to have legal public publications after a meeting between President Bourgiba and the General Secretary of the TCP,³⁷ in a clear move that showed that the TCP did not pose any "threat" to the Tunisian ruling class. The failure to present a sound alternative was a direct reason for the disintegration of the party support, opening the way for the growth of Islamism after being marginal in the beginning of the 1970s when it was mainly used by the regime to counter the Left.³⁸

In Lebanon, the fascist Phalange party, firstly aided by the Syrians, then later by Israel, engaged in a genocidal campaign against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese Left. Horrible massacres were carried out by the warring parties in the sectarian strife. That finally led to the tragic defeat of the Palestinian resistance and its eviction from Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982.³⁹ The LCP could not present the Lebanese masses with a revolutionary alternative. Firstly, the party had a relatively small sized militia comparatively to the others,⁴⁰ containing around 1,000 fighter in 1976; fifth of them died in one year (1975-6).⁴¹ Secondly, the Stalinist nature of the LCP, especially the strategy of popular frontism, caused vacillation in its strategy and tactics, and made it follow a line of politics that was far from being revolutionary or anti-sectarian. The party struck alliances with the "progressive" leaders in the Lebanese National Movement. Then it shifted to calling for "national unity" in 1982, suggesting:

Chamille Shamoun as a worthy presidential candidate to Lebanese national unity and stressed the necessity for the formation of a national unity government which would include Bashir Jumayyil and Walid Jumblat.⁴²

However, those "progressive" leaders were actually sectarian *Za'eems* whose parties were active in sectarian cleansing.⁴³ The LCP strategy focused all the time on striking alliance with *Za'eems*, instead of trying to unite workers and the oppressed from all sects against their *Za'eems* and against the Israeli invasion. One would try to imagine how a Christian worker would listen to communist arguments while he saw the LCP leaders courting figures such as Jumblat whose troops massacred indiscriminately Christian civilians at *Damour*!

In Syria, the SCP failed to provide an alternative for the Syrian masses other than the dictatorial Ba'athist regime. The SCP supported the Ba'athist military coup in 1966 and was admitted into the cabinet of the new regime.⁴⁴ Guided by its Stalinist ideology as the case of the ECP with Nasser, the SCP applauded the Ba'athist state-capitalist regime, and regarded its policies as "socialist":

We can say that Syria entered the stage of national democratic revolution and the stage of socialist revolution. We can describe [the Syrian measures] as far-reaching progressive measures that can be considered an attack on the centers of major capitalist power and the dominance of feudalism. This can form the initiation of the march toward building socialism if they are coupled with other socio-economic and political measures.⁴⁵

The SCP continued with its popular frontism policy, even with the coup organized by Hafez El-Assad in 1970. Following orders from Moscow, the SCP supported El-Assad, marking a new era of compromises. The SCP was admitted into the cabinet of the new regime, and became part of the Ba'athist establishment through its integration in the National Progressive Front that Assad had established. The SCP's power base kept on eroding, till it finally disintegrated in the 1980s. Building

upon the demoralization and the failure of the Left, the Islamists became the largest and most effective opposition forces against the regime by the late 1970s.⁴⁶

The experience of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was not radically different from its Syrian counterpart. The party was subject to a severe repressive campaign following the coup against the Kassem regime in 1963. The ICP had to go underground. With the come back of the Iraqi Ba'ath to power by military coup in 1968, the ICP allied itself with the Ba'ath regime, signing the National Action Pact in 1973, whereby the ICP became part of the ruling Progressive National Front⁴⁷

Guided by the Stalinist stages' theory and popular frontism, ICP considered Iraq to be passing through a "national democratic revolution" based on class alliance of "workers, peasants, urban bourgeoisie and progressive elements of the middle bourgeoisie".⁴⁸ The ICP hailed the resolutions of the Ba'athist regime, viewing that "the national democratic revolution had entered a new progressive stage, the stage of non-capitalist development."⁴⁹

In exchange for its integration within the establishment, the ICP made great compromises. It was agreed that the political organization within the army was to be the sole monopoly of the Ba'ath.⁵⁰ In addition to that:

The Iraqi Communist Party was expected to adhere to the role of loyal opposition; to recognize the regime as essentially progressive; to give full credit and unstinted praise to any measures which ostensibly fitted into a national front image; to steer clear of any plot; to abstain from disrupting the public peace; to prevent strikes and abstain from labour agitation.⁵¹

The main reason for the Ba'ath alliance with the ICP was the need for consolidating power of the new regime, and the need for an ally while facing the Kurdish rebellion in the North. With the collapse of the rebellion in 1975, the attitude of the Ba'ath changed.⁵² The ICP was expelled from the National Progressive Front in

1979,⁵³ followed by a campaign of repression that was soon to cause the disintegration of the Party. The compromises and the smashing of the ICP opened the door for Islamism to fill the vacuum as the only sound opposition to the regime.

Marshall described the situation:

In Iraq the ICP... aligned with the Ba'th, now presented by Communist leaders as a 'revolutionary' force,... soon found itself party to a savage war against the Kurds and repression of the Shiites. The Communists thereby strengthened communal divisions and suspicions, creating a political climate in which ideologies such as Islamism could prosper.⁵⁴

Egyptian Counterrevolution

The 1977 uprising brought to halt the attempts to implement its neo-liberal program. In fact, it took the regime more than a decade to regain the courage to implement it later in 1992.⁵⁵ However, a counterrevolution was launched by the regime to maintain its rule and crush the mass movement.

At the foreign policy level, the regime accelerated the pace of its rapprochement with the American camp in order to save itself from collapse. Economic aid packages from the Gulf and the US were immediately delivered to the Egyptian regime. The US provided in the same month of the uprising an emergency relief of \$250 million,⁵⁶ while the Gulf regimes provided another \$1 billion.⁵⁷ Over the following years, the Gulf regimes would intervene to provide huge aid estimated between \$16 billion to \$21 billion.⁵⁸

Out of despair, the regime attempted with failure to invade Libya to control its eastern oil fields.⁵⁹ Choices were limited; Sadat took the unprecedented step of travelling to Jerusalem on November 1977. Direct negotiations with the Israelis started, culminating in a signed peace treaty in 1979.⁶⁰ Egypt now moved completely to the American camp, with the "mission [of the regime] became that of a policeman

in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa against Soviet and Cuban expansion and the new adversaries became [pro-Soviet] Libya and [communist] Ethiopia".⁶¹

At the domestic level, the security forces killed 80 demonstrators and injured another 800 during the uprising.⁶² Then the regime cracked down on the Left, arresting 200 militants in addition to another 1,000 for allegedly participating in the events.⁶³ Sadat issued several laws sweeping away the civil liberties won by the mass movement in the 1970s. He literally copied laws from Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal penal codes, which allow the sentencing to 25 years of hard labor of those who organize strikes, demonstrations or mass assemblies.⁶⁴ A special Ethics Court was established to try political dissidents, where "conviction would result in suspension of all political rights, house arrest, travel bans and suspension of all economic activities".⁶⁵ The regime exerted more control on the press, closing down almost every leftist publication, even the legal publication of *al-Tagammu'* had to go out of business after being seized so often by the security.⁶⁶ That was accompanied by wide-scale purges against the 'leftists' in the means of communication and media, to be followed by the abolishing of the Ministry of Culture itself, where the "Left" had presence in its agencies.⁶⁷

The regime also moved to dominate the executive boards of the professional syndicates⁶⁸ and students' unions. A decree was issued in 1979, which smashed the students' movement gains fought for in a decade:

[The decree] banned the General Union of Egyptian Students, froze its assets, and authorized student unions only at the faculty level, where they would be directed by eleven-member councils including six professors; the dean of the faculty now had the power of veto over all decisions. This meant, more or less, a return to the situation of 1963...⁶⁹

Witch-hunting campaigns were launched by Sadat against the opposition from the Right and Left; legal and underground groups; and against independent thinkers, signaling severe erosion of legitimacy. The biggest campaign was on 5 September 1981 when he arrested thousands of dissidents from every tendency.⁷⁰ One month later, he was finally assassinated by the Islamic Jihad. The Mubarak regime used the incident and the "threat of terrorism" to impose martial law, enact more anti-civil liberty laws and increase the measures of repression against the Left and the Right.⁷¹

The 1977 uprising also signaled the beginning of the end for the Egyptian Left. Splits within virtually every communist organization, which were already suffering from factionalism, took place following the defeat of the uprising. There were tensions in the cadre base-leadership relations. Many militants were demoralized, in addition to the discrediting of the Left in the eyes of many sympathizers in specific and the public in general. The communist organizations did not disappear in the 1980s. They were still active in the universities, syndicates and several industrial workplaces, however their base of support was disintegrating.⁷² The ECP 8th of January finally collapsed in the 1985 after series of splits within the leadership, while the EWCP suffered from severe security blows following the uprising that "reduced [it] to scattered Marxist circles, and [its] journal ceased publication".⁷³ The remnants of both organizations were unified in the beginning of the 1990s to form the Unified Workers Party, however it was a "party on paper", meaning it was just a name without real existence on the ground. The same goes for the ECP, whose base of support kept on continuously disintegrating in the 1980s, and became another "party on paper" with the collapse of Stalinism in 1991.⁷⁴

The defeats suffered by the Left in Egypt created a vacuum that was gradually filled by Islamism starting from the mid-1970s. What started, as a state-sponsored

movement to counter the Left in the universities, was soon to grow building on the failures of the Left. By the 1980s, reformist Islamism, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, and radical Islamism, represented by the Jihad and *Gama'a Islamiyya*, became the strongest players in the Egyptian political arena.⁷⁵

Conclusion

The failure to push forward the revolutionary transformation process from the phase of uprising to the phase of insurrection resulted in the reversing of the process into a counterrevolution in the three examined levels. The dynamics of the counterrevolution are similar to the dynamics of stabilization used by the regimes in the preconditions phase, discussed in Chapter II. Violent coercion was used to bring the revolutionary transformation into halt. Whenever that tactic failed, the regimes resorted to reformism: seeking the help of Social Democrats and Stalinist CPs and conceding reforms to diffuse the revolutionary situation.

CONCLUSION

Although the January 1977 uprising was a milestone in the history of modern Egypt, the literature on this event is surprisingly insufficient in terms of quantity and quality. Among the works reviewed in Chapter I, the three "unconventional" ones are quite instructive with the arguments, analyses, syntheses and documentation they provide. However, no matter how radical they appeared in their analyses, none of the authors managed to "escape" the Stalinist framework. Abdel-Razek's study suffers from contradictions in the approach taken to analyze the pre-uprising and uprising phases as a result of the ideological vacillation of the Egyptian Left (of which he is a member) in its strategies and tactics. As for Shoukri and Sa'ad, their arguments were more coherent than that of Abdel-Razek's, yet they still represent a "radical" version of Stalinism. Indeed, all three restricted their alternatives to nationalist ones, which in turn spread the seeds for class collaboration.

Considering the lack of ideas put forth, there is ample room to develop yet another "unconventional" argument with respect to the 1977 events. The events were not "mob" riots that erupted from nowhere. The events were an uprising that came as a climax of the mass movement that was escalating in terms of militancy, organization and demand-articulation. The dismal failure of Egyptian Stalinism was the major reason for the defeat of the uprising. In fact, none of the Egyptian communist organizations managed to play the role of the "vanguard revolutionary party," which was crucially needed for the successful development of the uprising into an insurrection.

The three levels of analysis (global, regional and national) were extremely useful for this study in order to examine the nature of the Egyptian 1977 events. The radicalization within the Egyptian political arena was associated with radicalizing global and regional contexts. The defeat of the Egyptian uprising was also part of the defeat of global and regional uprisings. The connection was not confined to the objective conditions, but extended to the flow of radical ideology, coordination between the revolutionary organizations, and the coordination between the governments themselves to quell the rebellions.

Despite the differences in circumstances and the subjective factors from one political arena to another, the role played by the Stalinist CPs was almost identical: disrupting the revolutionary process, failing to provide an alternative for the *ancien regime*, or tailing "progressive" bourgeoisie within their societies. That led to the prevention of transforming the uprisings into successful insurrections that could overthrow capitalism. The growth of the Right in the late 1970s, whether it being the Tories and fascists in Europe or the Islamists in the Middle East, cannot be explained without the context of the failures of the Left during the 1960s and 1970s.

Though this study has focused primarily on the Egyptian context, the global and regional contexts were also examined. However, there are issues raised in that study that need to be further investigated. Most importantly is the deeper instigation of the performance of Arab communism in each country in the region and the connection between the failure of the Left and the evolution of Islamism. Within the Egyptian context, the study focused on communist organizations in the field of the mass movement. However, other movements were also playing an important role and need to be discussed in future studies: mainly the Nasserite movement, which was the second important actor, after the communists, in the political arena.

The mainstream tendencies in Political Science tend to focus on the so-called "power brokers" such as: presidents, kings, governments and "political systems". Though there is increasing research at present on social movements, mass movements are usually marginalized in the conventional approaches, or regarded as "one" of the factors in the political arena. This needs to be changed. Despite the importance of the so-called "power brokers", politics is still mainly conducted in the streets, even when the mass movement is in slumber. The decision making process of the "power brokers" is largely in response to street-politics. The "international" pressures or factors taken into consideration by the local "power brokers" can also be linked to "international" street-politics, in other words, the politics of the mass movements in the global context.

The historical materialist method, combined with the three levels of analysis, serve as a good tool for analyzing (and in fact revising) history *from below*. This can open the door widely for new syntheses to be developed that differ radically from the conventional views on important political events in modern history. The need to use such multiple levels of analysis is more relevant in the age of globalization and the communication revolution, where the "national" and "international" contexts are dialectically interconnected and integrated.

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- ²⁴ Marshall, *Intifada*, 233.
- ²⁵ *Al-Qadya al-Falastinya*, 56.
- ²⁶ Hussein, 308.
- ²⁷ These two expressions are widely used by the Egyptian public to describe demagogues.
- ²⁸ Sha'aban, 54-5.
- ²⁹ Sheik Imam and Ahmed Fouad Nigm were an artistic couple in the late 1960s till the mid-1980s. They were linked to the student movement and the Egyptian Left. Their songs expressed the Egyptian public mood.
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- ³¹ Ibid.
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- ³³ Hussein, 300, 310.
- ³⁴ Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, *Al-Mofawadat al-Sirrya Bayn al-'Arab wa Israel* (The secret negotiations between the Arabs and Israel), vol. 3, *Salam 'l-Awham* (The peace of illusions) (Cairo: Dar El-Shorouk 1996), 19.
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- ³⁶ Marshall, 122, 130-1.
- ³⁷ Hussein, 301, 310.
- ³⁸ Ibid. 299, 310-1.
- ³⁹ El-Salamony, 253-4.
- ⁴⁰ Ass'ad, 44-5.
- ⁴¹ Hussein, 314.
- ⁴² Ass'ad, 45-8.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 49.

⁴⁴ Hussein, 316.

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⁴⁶ Ismael and El-Sa'id, 129.

⁴⁷ Mohammed Youssef El-Guindy, *Massiret Hayati* (The path of my life) (Cairo: Dar El-Thaqafa El-Gadidah, 2001), 79.

⁴⁸ Ismael and El-Sa'id, 131, 145-6

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